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SUMMARY: The appellant, Secretary of State of Illinois, contests 
the conclusion of the courts below that the Illinois Business Take-Over 
Act confl.icts with the Williams Act amendme nts to the 1934 Securities 
Exchange Act. He also contests their conclusion that it violates the 
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FACTS: Appellant is charged with administration and enforcement 
of the Illinois Business Take-Over Act. The appellees, MITE and MITE 
Holdings, are Delaware corporations with their principal executive 
offices in New Haven, Connecticut. The appellees attempted to make a 
cash tender offer for the shares of Chicago Rivet and Machine Company, 
a publicly-held Illinois corporation with its principal executive 
offices in Illinois, without having to comply with the Illinois Act. 
Pursuant to § 14 (d) (1) of the Williams Act, 15 u.s.c. § 78 (d) (1), they 
filed a Schedule 14D-l with the SEC concerning the proposed offer. 
MITE's tender offer of $28 per share for all the shares of Chicago 
Rivet represented a $4 premium over the market price preceding the 
offer. 
The same day it filed its Schedule 14D-l with the SEC, MITE fil e d 
this suit in the district court, seeking to have the Illinois Act 
declared null and void on its face because it violated the Supremacy 
Clause and the Commerce Clause. Three days later, Chicago Rivet fi led 
a complaint in equity in the Court of . Common Pleas of Blair County, 
Pennsylvania, seeking to enjoin MITE from proceeding with its tend er 
offer because MITE was purportedly in violatio~ of the Pennsylvani a 
Takeover Disclosure Law. Chicago Rivet alleged th a t MITE's tender 
--------- ------
offer was subject to the Pennsylvania Act because Ch i cago Rivet had 
its principal place of business and substantial assets in the state . 
The Pennsylvania court issued an ex parte order granting Ch i cago Rive t 
a temporary injunction. 
On the same day that it filed its Pennsylvani a action, back in the 
Northern District of Illinois, Chicago Ri vet moved to dismiss · MITE' s 
challenge to the Illinois Act on the grounds that ther e wa s no cas e or 
controve rsy. The Illinoi s court, by con s0nt of th e pa r ti es , o r dered 
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that neither Chicago Rivet nor the Secretary would be allowed to file 
any action against MITE under the Illinois Act without two days notice. 
It otherwise continued MITE's requests for injunctive relief regarding 
the Act. 
The following day, MITE removed the Pennsylvania action to the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Pennsylvania. 
It then filed its own action in that court seeking to have that state's 
Act declared unconstitutional. Meanwhlle, the Pennsylvania Securities 
Commission announced that it would not proceed against MITE. This, and 
other setbacks in the Pennsylvania litigation, prompted Chicago Rivet 
and the Illinois Secretary of State to reinstitute the action under the 
Illinois Act. 
The Secretary concluded that MITE was about to violate the Illinois 
Act. He notified MITE that he was about to issue a cease and desist 
order. Chicago Rivet notified MITE that it would file suit in Circuit 
Court for Cook County to restrain MITE from making the tender offer. 
MITE renewed its request for relief in the Illinois federal district 
court, and the district court judge preliminarily enjoined the state 
from issuing the cease and desist order. MITE then published its 
I tender offer, which represented a $23,000,000 transaction, in the Wall Street Journal's national edition. ----
The district court later issued its final order declaring the Act 
null and void because it was preempted by the Williams Act and becau se 
it created an undue burden on interstate commerce in violation of the 
Commerce Clause. 
Three days later, pursuant to a written agreement with the Ch icagc 
Rivet Company, MITE withdrew its tender offer. That agreement provid • 
that MITE would have until March 5, 1979, to investigate Chicago Rive 
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and that it would have until March 12, 1979, to renew its offer. If it 
did not renew the offer by March 12, it would not at any time in the 
future acquire Chicago Rivet. On March 2, MITE announced it would not 
be renewing its offer. 
HOLDING BELOW: CA7 affirmed, agreeing with both conclusion s of 
the district court. It did not believe the case was moot because it 
felt that, if it reversed the district court, MITE, having made an 
offer, would be liable for penalty under the Illinois Act. 
CA7 found that the Illinois Act "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress." Hines v Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67. In CA7's view, th e 
Williams Act protects investors by a ''market approach" and is designed 
to preserve a neutral balance between incumbent managemer.t and the 
offeror. The Illinois Act upsets that bala nce. Hence , the Illinoi s 
Act is preempted by the Williams Act and violates the Supremacy Clause. 
CA7 also found that Illinois' interests in protecting resident 
shareholders and regulating control transfe rs are tenuous and cannot 
justify the Illinois Act's effect on interstate commerce. The Illinoi s 
statute undeniably slows the process of tender offers, depressing the 
volume of such activ i ty. Had the Secretar y of State enjoined this 
transaction, over $23 million dollars of interstate commerce would 
have been affected. 
CONTENTIONS: The appellant argues th a t this case raises impor tant 
issues because the great majority of state s have statutes similar t o 
the one that was invalidated here. CA7 e r red in holding th a t th e Act 
was preempted by the Williams Act. Th e Court has he ld that the so l e 
purpose of that Act was to protect investors confronted with a t e nder 
offer. Congr ess did not bar state regul a tion, and the Court has no t ed 
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that§ 28(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 "was plainly 
intended to protect, rather than to limit, state authority." Leroy v 
Great Western United, 443 U.S. 173, 182. The Williams Act does not 
contain language expressly preempting concurrent state regulation, and 
CA7 did not hold that the federal scheme of regulating tender offers 
was sufficiently pervasive to indicate a congressional intent to occupy 
the field. Absent explicit or implicit preemption, the validity of 
the Illinois Act depends upon whether it "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress." Hine~ v Davidowitz, supra. The Illinois Act does not 
stand as an obstacle to evenhandedness between management and the 
offeror; it merely provides added protection to the investor who is 
confronted with the offer. 
On the Commerce Clause issue, the appellant argues lhat the 
Illinois Act serves legitimate local interests and does so without 
discriminating against interstate commerce. Chicago Rivet has very 
many connections with Illinois. 43% of it common stock is held by 
Illinois residents. Protecting investo~s residing in a state has long 
been recognized as a legitimate state objective. Hall v Geiger-Jones, 
242 U.S. 539, 551. Moreover, by analogy to its authority to regulate 
the internal affairs of a corporation, a state may regulate tender 
offers consistently with the Commerce Clause. 
The appellees respond that the decision be low is plainly correct 
and that, in any case, the circumstances of this case make it briefi~g 
and argument inappropriate. 
First, the decision below clearly and thoroughly discusses the 
merits of the constitutional questions and is consistent with the only 





statute. Great Western United v Kidwell, .S71 F2d 12S6 (CAS), reversed 
on venu~ grounds sub nom Leroy v Great Weste~n United. 
Second, there is no longer a case or controversy. MITE has 
withdrawn its tender offer and, by written agreement, cannot make an 
offer again. And, MITE would not be liable for penalties because it 
acted under cover of the district court's ruling. 
Finally, the appellees assert that it is significant that the 
federal law applicable ~o tender offers has significantly changed 
subsequent to the district court opinion below. SEC Rules appearing 
at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-l et ~ (1980) effectively preempt inconsistent 
state statutes. A decision in this case would not reach those rules. 
------------DISCUSSION: The questioR of the constitutionality of state ---takeover statutes is an important one. The question was before the 
Court in Leroy v Great Western United Corp, 443 U.S. 173; however, the 
Leroy Court decided that case on venue grounds and did not reach the 
questions of the preemption and the Commerce Clause. In Leroy, CAS 
found Idaho's takeover statute unconstitutional. Here, CA7 found 
Illinois statute unconstitutional. A district court has upheld the 
Ohio takeover statute against a preemption and Commerce Clause attack 
similar to those presented here. AMCA International Corp v Krouse, 
482 F.Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979). 
There is a potential problem ~ith regard to mootness. In my view, 
(
however, since the Secretary has indicated that he intends to continue 
the enforcement action against MITE if he prevails, the issues are not 
moot. Moreover, it is probably character i stic of this type of case 
that the tender offer is withdrawn during litigation. Thus, it may be 




In light of the new SEC regulations, it would be better to note in 
a case that brought them before the Court. Nonetheless, this case 
does present important issues on the merits. 
For the moment, I recommend calling for the views of the SG. With 
a caveat ·on the issue of mootness, the Court probably will find that 
it should note. 
There is a response. 
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of th e Court . 
federal court's injunction against stste prosecution. 
2. Whether Illinois' tender offer statute is preempt-
ed by the Williams Act. 
3. Whether Illinois' tender offer statute contravenes 
the Commerce Clause. 
I. Background 
Resps Mite sued petr Illinois the same day--January 
19, 1979--that Mite commenced a tender offer for Chicago 
Rivet's shares. Mite's suit sought to retrain Illinois from 
enforcing its 
J4 
tender offer statute. This /\statute requires, 
· t 1' f '1' f t · f d ff · th the state 9-~ · 1n er a 1a, 1 1ng o a no 1ce o ten er o er w1 
&-~ 
officials and completion of a 20-day waiting period, and con-__...___ 
templates the possibility that Illinois would hold hearings to 
adjudicate whether the offer "is inequitable or would work or 
tend to work a fraud • " App., 54a. 
Chicago Rivet instigated skirmishing in Pennsylvania 
courts. When this proved unavailing, the focus of the fight 
returned to Illinois. On February 1, 1979, Illinois warned 
Mite that it intended to serve it with a cease and desist order 
on February 5. The DC entered a preliminary injunction enjoin-
ing enforcement of the Illinois law on February 2. Mite pub-
lished its tender offer on February 5. That same day, Chicago 
Rivet also commenced an offer for its own stock. The DC en-
tered a declaratory judgment and permanent injunction against 
Illinois on February 9, declaring that Illinois' law both was 
preempted by the Williams Act and violated the Commerce Clause. 
On February 12, Chicago Rivet and Mite agreed to with-
draw their mutual tender offers. Mite was given 30 days to 
decide whether it would either make an unopposed offer at a 
stipulated higher price or refrain permanently from further 
efforts to acquire Chicago Rivet. Mite decided to take the 
latter course on March 2, 1979. On October 17, 1980, the CA 7 C 1/ 7 










II. Discussio~ . 
Mite contends both in its Motion to Dismiss or Affirm 
and in its brief that this action is moot. Mite reasons that 
it did not purchase any Chicago Rivet shares before February 
12. The Mite-Chicago Rivet agreement of February 12, 1979, 
bars Mite from future tender offers against Chicago Rivet. 
Therefore the only basis for continuing Mite liability is for 
its past violation of the Illinois Act. Since Mite was pro-
tected by the the DC's injunction against Illinois' enforcement 
during this period, Mite asserts that it can no longer be pros-
ecuted due to its reliance on the DC's protection. Therefore 
this controversy is moot. 
Analysis on this point is hampered by the fact that 
Illinois never answers the argument. The SG discussed the 
problem in note 14 of its initial amicus brief urging af fir-
mance (but not in his full brief on the merits). His position 
was that "the realistic possibility of enforcement proceedings 
based on appellees' past conduct may be sufficient to avoid 
mootness in this case" (emphasis added). 
Mite's contrary argument has two prongs: state and 
federal. The state argument asserts that no criminal liabli ty ----can be imposed for action ta,ken in reliance ~ a federal CA 
opinion, as a matter of Ill law. See Mite brief at 12 n. 9. 
This is unavailing because it does not foreclose the possibili-
ty of civil liability. Moreover, Mite relied only on the DC 
'*• 
opinion; the CA decision was not rendered until well after the 
disputed activity had ceased by agreement. 
Mite's federal argument is that it would violate Due 
Process to subject it to state penalties for action taken in 
reliance on the DC's injunction against state prosecution. 
This argument turns on the effect to be given to the DC's in-
junction against state prosecution. 
On one hand, Illinois could argue that Mite's reliance 
should have been informed by the awareness that the DC order is 
not unconditional. Because a federal appellate court is the 
final judge of the DC order, Mite's reasonable reliance thus 
cannot be absolutely free of risk. Mite must be charged with 
knowledge of the vulnerability of the DC authority upon which 
it relied. It therefore cannot complain of unfair surprise if 
this foreseeable risk--reversal of the DC on appeal--in fact 
comes to pass. State prosecution thus is not unfairly surpris-
ing, goes the argument, and should not violate Due Process. 
On the other hand, it can be argued this argument ac-
cords insufficient authority to DC orders. Mite could say 
that, if it were willing to act with risk of prosecution, if 
could have proceeded to violate state law and raised its feder-
al claims as defenses to that state prosecution. The entire 
function of declaratory judgment and injunction proceedings--
when permitted1--is to eliminate that risk of prosecution. 
1Federal injunctions against state prosecutions raise Younger 
v. Harris concerns. Illinois has made no abstention claims, al-
Footnote continued on next page. 
Mite acted as swiftly as it could have to obtain the injunction 
though it appears it would have had at least an arguable case for 
Younger abstention. The Illinois law is backed by both criminal 
and civil penalties. See App., 60a-62a. The Younger abstention 
doctrine applies to both sorts of prosecutions. See, e.g., 
Juidice v. Vail, 430 u. S. 327 (1977). It appears that Mite 
would have an opportunity to raise its federal defenses in state 
proceedings; the Illinois statute authorizes remedies to be im-
posed by state courts and there has been no showing that Illinois 
procedural law would bar assertion of federal defenses. See 
Moore v. Sims, 442 u.S. 415, 432 (1979). Although the timing-of 
this situation would demand an expedited decision, that would be 
true in federal court as well. Finally, it is doubtful that Mite 
would be able to claim, by virtue of bad faith state prosecution 
or a flagrantly unconstitutional statute, see id. at 424, that 
this case should be treated as an exception to Younger's usual 
policy. 
There are three reasons, however, why Younger probably 
should have no relevance to this case. First, it is not clear 
that Illinois' interest in enforcing its tender offer law is so 
strong as to resemble "vi tal concerns [such] as enforcement of 
contempt proceedings ••• or the vindication of 'important state 
policies such as safeguarding the fiscal integrity of [public 
assistance] programs' .••• " Moore v. Sims, 442 u. s. at 423; 
see also id. at n.8. 
Second, it is likewise not clear whether the state ad-
ministrative proceedings were sufficiently advanced or of sue~ 
character as to call Younger's policies into play. Here the fed-
eral complaint had been filed prior to any Illinois administra-
tive proceedings. The DC adjourned its proceedings on the order 
that neither Chicago Rivet not Illinois initiate action against 
Mite without two days notice to Mite and the DC. On February 1, 
the Illinois Secretary of State issued a cease and desist order 
against Mite's tender offer and notified that it would serve this 
order on Mite on February 5. The DC enjoined the Ilinois en-
forcement on February 2. Compare Hicks v. Miranda, 422 u. s. 
332, 349 (1975) ("where state criminal proceedings are begun 
against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is 
filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have 
taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v. 
Harris should apply with full force") (emphasis added), with 
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 u. S. 922, 930 (1975) (plaintiff 
may challenge the const1tutionalty of a state statute in federal 
court in the absence of "an on-going state criminal proceeding," 
even though state criminal prosecution is imminent). 
Third, and most importantly, Illinois has raised no 
Younger claim. Younger is a federal rule of comity. Although I 
have found no authority for this proposition, it seems most rea-
Footnote continued on next page. 
0. 
against state prosecution. Once it won this relief, it could 
not, as the winning party, appeal for further certainty. That 
task was then Illinois'. Had Illinois wished to preserve its 
right to prosecute in the face of imminent Mite behavior autho-
rized by the DC, Illinois should have sought both to have the 
DC's order stayed pending review as well as expedited appeal. 
Since it did neither, this argument would conclude, Illinois 
has forfeit its right to prosecute. 
The latter reasoning makes the most sense to me. Any 
other position will remove the authority an unappealed and 
unstayed DC injunction should carry as a means of enforcing 
federal decisions. Despite the fact that Mite has been able to 
find only one old CA opinion to support its position directly, 
see United States v. Mancuso, 139 F.2d 90, 92 (CA3 1943), I 
think this is the better view. 
On this logic, the threat of mootness is real. It is 
circumvented only if this case falls within the 11 Capable of 
repetition yet evading review 11 category. But this category 
requires that 11 there [is] a reasonable expectation that the 
same complaining party would be subject to the same action 
sonable that such a federalism concern can be deemed waived when 
the State--the party that the doctrine seeks to protect--does not 
invoke it. Because Illinois continues its failure to mention the 
point, I think the Court should just ignore this issue--unless 
some end not now apparent to me would be served by its utiliza-
tion. Complete omission of reference to Younger will have very 
little, if any, precedential weight. 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 u.s. 147, 149 (1975) (per 
curiam) (emphasis added). In this case, the Chicago Rivet/Mite ----agreement bars Mite from attempting another tender offer 
~- -------- -- -
against Chicago Rivet. And no party even alleges that there is 
a "reasonable expectation" that Mite will make tender offers 
for other Illinois companies. 
I conclude the case is moot. "The established prac-
tice of the Court in dealing with a civil case from a court in 
the federal system which has become moot while on its way here 
------~ 
United States v. Munsingwear, 340 u. s. 36, 39 (1950). 
B. Preemption 
Assuming that the case is not moot, the first issue on 
the merits is whether the federal Williams Act preempts the 
Illinois statute. The parties agree that the relevant test is 
whether the state law "stands as an obstancle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress" in enacting the Williams Act. 2 Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941). See Petr brief at 15: Resp brief at 
2This preemption test slao is codified in the federal Act: 
"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the 
securities commission ••. of any State over any security or any 
person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of 
this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder." 15 u.s.c. 
§78bb (a) • 
8. 
30; SG brief at 5. Mite and the SG cqntend that three eatures '5 G :r-
of the Illinois law are objectionable: vision fo~~ 
state hearings of potentially unlimited 
commencement notification requirement; its authoriza-
tion of a decision substantive "equity" of the 
proposed offer. they have a strong argument on each 
point. 
1. State hearings 
9..?6 
The Illinois law does require that hearings be held . 
~
upon the request of the Secretary of State; a majority of the ~ 
target's outside directors; or Illinoi~ residents holding 10%~ 
of the target shares. See §137.57(A), App., 53a. The hearings 
are to commence with 10 days of the request unless the date is 
extended "for the protection of the offerees in this State." 
App., at 53a-54a. "[T]he take-over shall not become registered 
until so declared by order of the Secretary," id. at 53a, and 
the Secretary shall make a determination "within 15 business 
days after the conclusion of the hearing, unless such time is 
extended by order of the Secretary •••• " Id. at 54a. The 
Illinois Act consequently provides for an admisistrative mecha-
nism that probably can be invoked at the behest of incumbent -management and that, on its face, offers no assurance of swift 
completion. 
1/t 
In enacting the Williams Act, the Court has noted that 
in "Congress 
" 
expressly disclaimed an intention to provide a 
weapon for management to discourage takeover bids • • • • In-
deed, the Act's draftmen commented on the 'extreme care' which 
was taken 'to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in 
favor of management or in favor of the person making the take-
over bid. [citing Senate and House reports]" Rondeau v. 
Mosinee Paper Co. , 422 U. S. 49, 58-59 (197 5) • In short, the 
Williams Act seeks to maintain a neutrality in affecting the 
outcome of takeover bids. 
There seems to be little doubt that forcing delay is a 
known weapon in tender offer battles. This understanding is 
•(~-
confirmed by the portion of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti trust ~ "1 
Improvements Act's legislative history that the SG 
~
quotes at ~ 
~ 
10-11 of his brief: 
[I]t is clear that this short [ten-day] wait-
ing period was founded on congressional con-
cern that a longer delay might unduly favor 
the target firm's incumbent management, and 
permit them to frustrate ~a~ pr~-~ompetLtive 
cash tenders. This ten- ay wa1t1ng period 
~ores the basic purpose of the Wil-
liams Act--to maintain a neutral policy to-
wards cash tender offers, by avoiding lengthy 
delays that might discourage their chances for 
success. 
~· 
This legislative history establishes a fact that can 
be verified in professional commentary: delay is a tender of-
fer tool typically used only by incumbent management in tender 
offer defense. See, e.g., Great western United Corp. v. 
Kidwell, 577 F. 2d 1256, 1278 n. 49 (CAS 1978) (citing author i-
ties). Although there is much debate about whether delaying 





App., 20a-2la, it does seem clear that delay 
/-M~~ ~ 
nds to benefit ~ 
incumbents and hurt offerors. On this bas s, the Illinois 
statute stands as an obstacle ement of federal 
policy: 
----...._, 
neutrality in tender offer fights. 
.___ 
Illinois has no 
convincing reply to this point. See petr brief at 20-21. I 
conclude the Williams' Act is preemptive on this point. 
2. Pre-commencement notification 
Illinois' tender offer law specifies that it is unlaw-
ful "for any person to make a take-over offer unless the take-
App., 49a. "A take-over offer shall become registered 20 busi-
ness days after the filing of the registration statement 
" §l37.54(E), App., 52a. The statute thus requires that 
offerors make their detailed disclosures well before they are 
actually permitted to make their tender offers. 3 
The SG argues that Congress has considered such a pre-
I 
commencement notification provision on six different occasions,' 
but has refused to enact such a measure due to the imbalance it 
would create in tender offer fights. His most persuasive leg-
islative history is found at 15. There he quotes a vice presi-
3The SEC subsequently promulgated federal regulations that 
would prohibit state pre-commencement notification provisions. 
See SG brief at 5-6 n.5. Te authority so to act is dis-
puted. See amicus brief of irgini at 3-5. In any event, these 
regulations by their timing apply to this suit. 
..L..Lo 
dent of the New York Stock Exchange stating that disclosure of 
the offer price in advance of the offer will tend to drive the 
stock price toward that level. This will hamper the offeror's 
purchase efforts; either the offeror will have to raise its 
price or will suffer the loss of the offer premium that was 
calculated to induce sales. The SG's argument thus is similar 
to the hearing delay provisions: that the Illinois provision 
puts a finger on the tender of fer scale (in favor of incum-
bents), while the federal policy is to maintain neutrality. 
I find this contention persuasive in view of Illinois' 
weak rebuttal. Illinois simply cites to DeCanas v. Bica, 424 
U. S. 351, 360 (1976) , for the proposition that congressional 
rejection of a provision does not mean states are precluded 
from adopting similar provisions. Illinois brief at 19. "In-
deed, Congress' failure to enact such general sanctions rein-
forces the inference that Congress believes this problem does 
not yet require uniform national rules and is appropriately 
addressed by the States as a local matter." 424 u. S., at 360 
n.9. No doubt this is a logical inference to draw for some 
types of provisions in the absence of explicit legislative his-
tory. But the explicit legislative history language and re-
peated congressional rejections convince me that the SG has the 
better side of this debate. Therefore I think the Illinois 
pre-commencement notification provision also is preempted. 
3. Review of substantive fairness 
The final aspect of the Illinois statute is its provi-
sion that the Secretary may deny the tender offer's registra-
tion. He is authorized to do this, inter alia, if he finds 
"that the take-over offer is inequitable, or would tend to work 
a fraud or deceit upon the offerees ..• " §l37.57(E), App., 
54a (emphasis added). The Williams Act's purpose, however, is 
"to make the relevant facts known so that the shareholders have 
a fair opportunity to make their decision." SG brief at 12-13 
(quoting House and Senate reports) (emphasis added). This con-
trast between a "regulatory" and a "market" approach to pro-
tecting investors is, I believe, the plainest federal/state 
conflict in this case and the most likely candidate for preemp-
tion. (Illinois' argument that its law does not authorize the 
Secretary to make substantive judgment about the fairness of an 
offer is contrary to the words of the statute and is otherwise 
unsupported. See Illinois brief at 21-22 & n.8.) 
My conclusion therefore is that the Williams Act pre-
empts all three objectionable portions of the Illinois statute. 
The Court need not rule on the possible preemption of the re-
mainder of the Act; these three sections are the only ones Mite 
and the SG attack. By t~e same ~oken, this holding would be 
sufficient to affirm the CA7. The Commerce Clause issue--which 
I turn to next--would be at most an alternative route to the 
same result. 
C. Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause is always difficult, in large mea-
sure due to the ad hoc nature of the law in this area. As you 
wrote in Raymond Motor Transport, Inc. v. Rice, in these re-
gions "experience teaches that no single conceptual approach 
identifies all of the factors that may bear on a particular 
case." 434 U. S. 429, 441 (1978) • The most widely accepted 
generalization seems to be Justice Stewart's from Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 u. s. 137, 142 (1970). There he wrote: 
Where the statute regulates [1] evenhandedly 
to effectuate a legitimate local interest, and 
its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld [ 2] unless the 
burden imposed is clearly excessive in 
raltionship to the putative local benefits •. 
If a legitimate local purpose is found, 
then the question becomes one of degree. And 
the extent of the burden that will be tolerat-
ed will of course depend on the nature of the 
local interest involved, and on whether it 
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact 
on interstate activities. [Emphasis added.] 
This statement is most usefully broken down into a 
two-part test for this case: (1) Is the Illinois Act parochi-
al or evenhanded regulation? As your opinion in Kassle v. Con-
solidated Freightways Corp., 101 s.ct. 1309 (1981) shows, this 
Court is willing to scrutinize local justifications very close-
ly if it suspects that regulation is not being imposed on an 
evenhanded basis. (2) If evenhanded, does the regulation nev-
ertheless have an excessive impact on interstate commerce in 
comparison to the weight of the local interests thereby served? 
I organize my discussion around these two inquiries 
1. Parochial or evenhanded regulation? 
This choice of characterizatio'n turns on whether the 
Illinois act primarily is viewed as a effort to guard its resi-
dent consumers (of securities) against potential failings in 
the securities market (such as fraud or imperfect information), 
or as an attempt to shield the incumbent management of its res-
ident corporations from the threat of acquisition in the na-
tional market for subsidiaries. The former is the type of wel-
fare regulation generally sustained under Commerce Clause at-
tack. See, e.g., Breard v. Alexandria, 341 u. S. 622 (1951) 
(upholding municipal privacy ordinance that banned unconsented 
door-todoor solicitations by in- and out-of-state salesmen); 
California v. Thompson, 313 U. S. 109 (1941) (upholding state 
licensing of ticket agents selling inter- and intrastate tours, 
as a means of limiting fraud). The latter seems the type of 
economic favoritism aimed at insulating local from national 
markets that has proved vulnerable to Commerce Clause chal-
lenge. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511 (1935) (in-
validating state effort to protect local dairy farmers from 
lower priced out-of-state competition). 
On one hand, the Illinois Act does protect local eco-
nomic interests from competition in the national marketplace to 
some extent. As the previous section explained, the Act's 
three objectionable provisions can make it harder for a nation-
al buyer searching for a subsidiary to purchase those corpora-
tions subject to the act--which are only corporations with a 
close nexus with Illinois. 4 In this sense, the Illinois Act to 
a degree protects Illinois management from national competitors 
who be·lieve that they could manage more efficiently. The Illi-
nois Act consequently does have a parochial element. 
This element, however, has at most a marginal efect. 
Although delay may tend to favor incumbents, the Act's provi-
sian's do not purport--and in all likelihood do not act--to ban 
completely all acquisitions of Illinois-related corporations. 
The impediments to purchase are more subtle. This marginal 
effect may be sufficiently upsetting in the preemption context-
-where the test is whether federal statutory objectives are 
obstructed. But the marginality of this effect militates 
against characterizing the Illinois Act as wholly parochial 
legislation. 
Similarly, the impediments are imposed across the 
board; there is no more favorable treatment of Illinois-related 
purchasers. In addition, the Illinois Act has a "comity" pro-
vision specifying that the Act does not apply if the Illinois 
Secretary of State determines that other jurisdictions have 
regulations that "afford protection to securityholders located 




have 10% of security holders located in Illinois, or 
satisfy two of the following three conditions: 
a. principle executive office in Illinois; 
b. organized under Illinois law; or 
c. at 10% of capital "represented in" Illinois. 
§137.52-10, App., 48a. 
in this State substantially equal to that afforded • by 
this Act." §137.53, App., 49a (emphasis added). Although this 
evidenee of consumer protection is ambiguous (as it could be 
said that "protection to securityholders" is simply a euphemism 
referring to comparable provisions that obstruct tender 
offers) , its language does point to a concern with consumer, 
rather than incumbent management, protection. 
Finally and most importantly, Illinois does advance 
consumer protection arguments for its regulation. See Illinois 
brief at 25. Unlike Iowa's safety arguments in Kassel (and 
Wisconsin's safety assertions in Raymond Motor), Illinois' con-
sumer protection arguments must be credited with some weight. 
After all, the federal government has seen fit to impose gener-
ally similar regulations via the Williams Act. Given this ten-
able characterization of welfare/consumer protection regula-
tion, I think the Illinois act probably should survive the 
first prong of this two part Commerce Clause test. 
2. Excessive impact on interstate commerce 
compared to strength of the local justification? 
Illinois' law clearly applies to a large volume of 
interstate commerce. The facts of this case illustrate that 
some $23 million in interstate security purchases were at is-
sue. Although the Illinois Act does not by its terms prevent 
such commerce, it does regulate .J:.. t. This regulation has an 
impact on interstate commerce. Two features of this impact are 
important. 
The first is the magnitude of the impact. As previ-
ously explained, the primary effect is delay--with the poten-
tial that the Illinois Secretary of State will declare the 
tender offer invalid as "inequitable." See pages 10-11 supra. 
(Neither the CA 7, Mite, nor the SG have complained about the 
additional disclosure requirements imposed by the Illinois act. 
I therefore disregard these.) The magnitude of the impact is 
hard to pinpoint. The statute provides for potentially unlim-
i ted delay but has corresponding exceptions that permit the 
Secretary, in his discretion, to limit or accelerate the pro-
cess. But the minimum typical case would appear to involve a 
15 business day period from the time of the offeror's notice of 
offer, see §13 7. 57 (A) , ApP-.-, 53a, a 10 business day period 
from the time of request to the time of hearing, see 
§137.57(C), App., 53a, and (assuming a one-day hearing--a com-
pletely speculative assumption), a 15 business day from the 
conclusion of the hearing until the Secretary's determination. 
See §137 .57 (D), App. 54a. This totals up to at least 40 busi- tf/) ~..f 
ness days--as compared with the Williams Act's 10 day period. //!, 
~ pace of modern tender offers, a delay of 40 business 1 tJ 4 > 
days must, I think, be counted as significant. 
The second aspect of the Act's impact on commerce is 
its geographic scope. As the SG and Mite take pains to point -------out, the Illinois Act purports to have a global effect. The 
Secretary, by his decision to hold hearing or prevent registra-
tion, blocks the offeror's tender offer to security holders 
wherever they are located. In this instance, Mite--a Delaware 
corporation with offices in Connecticut--offered to buy Chicago 
Rivet shares from its shareholders, 73% of whom reside located 
outside of Illinois. (Fifty six percent of Chicago Rivet's 
total number of shares are held outside of Illinois.) App.' 
33a. There is nothing in the Illinois Act that requires that 
~ of the shareholders reside in Illinois, because the appli-
cability of the act is premised solely on the target company's 
connection with Illinois. See note 2 supra. 5 I therefore con-
clude that both the magnitude and the geographic scope of the 
Illinois Act's impact on interstate commerce are quite signifi-
cant. 
Against these factors must be balanced the justifica-
tions that Illinois asserts for its statute. These are two. 
The first is the protection of Illinois investors. Petr brief 
at 25. Illinois argues that its protection supplements the 
Williams Act in an important way and that this interest should 
be entitled to deference. 
Noramlly such an argument would be entitled to consid-
5one way to analyze this case would be on an "as applied" ba-
sis, taking into account the number of shareholders actually lo-
cated in Illinois in each case. This case--where about 30% of 
the shareholders reside in Illinois--then would be distinguished 
from cases in which no--or all--shareholders resided in the 
state. This factor presumably will become increasingly important 
as the balancing between commercial impact and local regulatory 
justification becomes closer. 
erable weight, I think. But in this context I believe the con-
clusion developed in the earlier preemption analysis is 
relevant--viz., that Congress has considered more extensive 
tender offer regulation but has rejected this alternative in 
favor of neutrality between offerors and target incumbents. 
See pages 8-9 supra. This is equivalent to saying that the 
benefits of added regulations--like Illinois' --are outweighed 
by the resulting burdens on interstate commerce. These burdens 
are mainly those resulting from the insulation of inefficient 
Illinois managers from the efficiency-maximizing force of expo-
sure to the national tender offer market. If you were persuad-
ed by the legislative history analysis in the preemption dis-
cussion, this should have implications here for the weight to 
be attached to Illinois' asserted regulatory justification. 
This suggested deference to a congressional judgment 
does, of course, have the potential of mixing the preemption 
and the Commerce Clause analyses to a degree. Perhaps this is 
an argument for deciding the case only on the preemption 
ground. But I have trouble seeing why such a national legisla-
tive weighing is not relevant in this Commerce Clause context. 
After all, Commerce Clause judgments from this Court are always 
subject to congressional revision. It is not clear why nation-
al legislative judgments should be able to excuse, but not 
strengthen, this Court's finding that a state action intrudes 
to an impermissible degree on the national marketplace. 
If you decide this congressional judgment is not rele-
vant (or not clear), however, the balancing in this case is 
more difficult. Although I am less sure of this conclusion, I 
tend to think the Illinois law still should be invalid. The 
national market of efficient managment seeking subsidiary ac-
quisitions is an important one. The Illinois law blocks this 
market to a considerable--and potentially unlimited--degree. 
The majority of the shareholders that Illinois claims to pro-
tect do not live in Illinois. Nore need ~' according to its 
law. While state efforts with more tightly circumscribed 
timelines and with closer mandatory connections with the 
State's investor population probably would pass muster, I think 
that Illinois' effort reaches too far in this case. 
Illinois' second justification for its statute is its 
traditional power to regulate the "internal affairs" of Illi-
nois corporations. I have a difficult time separating this 
justification from the first--protection of Illinois investors. 
Illinois analogizes its law to a "de facto proxy solicitation." 
Petr brief at 26. I do not understand how this is different 
than regulation undertaken for the protection of Illinois in-
vestors. Whether traditional or not, it seems to me the proper 
way to calculate the weight of this regulatory interest is ac-
cording to the analysis in the preceeding paragraphs. I there-
fore conclude that the Illinois law's substantial impact on 
interstate commerce outweighs the local regulatory justifica-
tion that Illinois asserts. 
III. Conclusion 
This case probably is moot. The DC's injunction pre-
------------------------venting Illinois' prosecution of its law--so long as Illinois 
failed to obtain a stay or an appellate reversal of the order--
should be held to im~unize Mite from contemporaneous or subse-
quent state prosecution. Because the DC order should protect 
Mite in this regard, the parties no longer have a live dispute. 
The decisions below should be vacated with instruction to dis-
miss the complaint as moot. 
If the case is not moot, then Mite should win an af-
firmance on preemption grounds. The Williams Act embodies pol-
icies both of neutrality between the contestants in tender of-
fer battles and of sovereignty of investor (as opposed to agen-
cy) investment decision. Y~t ~he Illinoi$ act's provisions 
advantage incumbent management and lessen inve~tor sovereignty 
to a degree. They do . this by providing for significant delay, 
for required pre-com~encement notification, and for the possi-
bility of state agency review of the substantive fairness . of 
the proposed tender offer. These provisions should be preempt-
ed because they obstruct achievement of the federal policies of 
the Williams Act. 
Although the Court need not reach this altenative 
ground for affirming the CA7, I believe that Mite also has a 
winning argument on the Commerce Clause--although this reason-
ing is less certain because of the analytical vagaries in this 
field. But by my estimation, the Illinois statute has an un-
justifiably great impact on interstate commerce. The Act ap-
plies to a substantial volume of interstate commerce. It af-
fects this time-sensitive commerce by delaying it on a global 
basis. This significant impediment on interstate commerce out-
weighs Illinois' proffered justifications, which reduce to the 
single value of investor protection. Normally this value would 
be entitled to substantial weight. But, in this instance, we 
have a congressional judgment that such additional regulation 
is not very important. If deference is given to this judgment-
-which seems appropriate--Illinois' justification should be 
found to be outweighed by its statute's interstate commercial 
impact. If this judgment is not given weight, the question is 
closer. I still come down, however, on the side of Commerce 
Clause invalidity. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE W>< . ..J . BRENNAN, .JR. February 2, 1982 
RE: No. 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear Thurgood: 
I agree. 
Justice Marsha 11 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
/( ·1 I) !/. i--L \_ lJ 
I ' 
.iuprtutt <lfonrl of lltt ~tb ,jtws 
.. zudfington. ~· <If. 2ll&i'!~ 
CHAMBERS O F" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
February 3, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear Thurgood: 
While I agree generally with your circulating draft 
opinion in this case, I have some difficulty reconciling the 
last four sentences before the Roman numeral on page 11 with 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 u.s. 147, which you cite on page 
10, and with Lewis' treatment of that case in his presently 
circulating draft opinion1 1n Murphy v. Hunt, No. 80-2165. 
Up until the sentence beginning on the fifth lLne on page 11 
of your draft, "Nor is there any risk that the question 
whether the Illinois Act is constitutional will always 
escape review by this Court, even in -cases involving other 
cor · t t impression that you are following 
1nstein v. Bradfor there must be a probability that 
his p~if will continue to have a 
ontroversy with this rticular defendant in order to come 
wi of repetition, yet evading review" 
exception to the mootness principle. But beginning with the 
sentence just referred to, I think that sentence and the 
l 
several that come after it could be read as expanding the 
exception to cover situations where there is no probability 
that these particular parties will again litigate, but where 
the question at issue might nonetheless continue to "escape 
review". 
I, for one, have great reservations about such an 
expansion of the "capable of repetition, yet . evading review" 
exception to the mootness principle. I think it is 
demonstrably contrary to Weinstein v. B dford, supra, and 
if interpreted as I suggest woula-req~· a different result 
in Lewis' circulatio~·n Murphy v. Hunt. If you mean no 
more than to make a actical observat' n, without 
broadening the except1 the idea ay be unexceptionable, 
- 2 -
but if this is the case I do think some of the language 
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CHA M BERS OF , 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVEN S 
February 4, 1982 
Re: 80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite 
Dear Thurgood: 
Your novel holding that a federal court has the 
power to grant immunity from enforcement of a state 
law even if the state law is valid is one that I cannot 
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CHAMBERS 0 F 
..JUSTICE BYRO N R . WHITE 
Februa r y 8 , 19 82 
Re: 80-1188 -Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
and Mite Holdings, Inc. 
Dear Thurgood, 
I shall await John's dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
I' I t -~ / ~ 
I 
Justice Marshall 














From: Justice Marshall 
Circulated:------:--
fi:.B 12 1982 
Recirculated:------------
3rd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1188 · · 
JAMES EDGAR, APPELLANT v. MITE CORPORATION 
AND MITE HOLDINGS, INC. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[February -, 1982] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case arises out of an attempt by appellees, Mite Cor-
poration and Mite Holdings, Inc. (referred to collectively as 
Mite), to make a cash tender offer for another corporation, 
Chicago Rivet & Machine Co. Before making the offer, ap-
pellees sought to enjoin the Secretary of State of Illinois from 
enforcing the Illinois Business Take-Over Act (Illinois Act), 
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.51 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1980) 
The Illinois Act regulates purchases of stock in corporatio s 
having substantial connections with Illinois. The U · ed 
States District Court for the Northern District of mms 
granted injunctive relief, holding that the Illinois A is pre-
empted by the Williams Act amendments to the ecurities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78m(d)-(e , 78n(d)-(t), 
and imposes an impermissible burden on inters te commerce 
in violation of the Commerce Clause. App. o Juris. State-
ment (J.S. App.) 32a-41a. The United S tes Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit affirme . Mite Corp. v. 
Dixon, 633 F. 2d 486 (1980). We no d probable jurisdic-
tion. -- U. S. -- (1981). Beca e we conclude that the 
case is moot, we now vacate the ·u e of the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals 1 emand the case to the 
M:stT~:;~ i~lt":cJ·~·wHe .. ~ wocJd w<Ut +o 
W \-iQ ) S ~ts-h~ CUA~ *~JDI V1 , 
~ 
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Appellees are corporations organized under the laws of 
Delaware with their principal executive offices in Connecti-
cut. Mite Holdings, Inc., is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Mite Corporation. Chicago Rivet & Machine Co. (Chicago 
Rivet), the target of Mite's takeover bid, was a defendant in 
the District Court, but did not participate in the proceedings 
in the Court of Appeals, and is not a party here. Chicago 
Rivet is· organized under the laws of Illinois. Although its 
principal executive offices are located in that state, its princi-
pal place of business is in Pennsylvania. 
Appellant James Edgar is the Secretary of State of Illinois, 
and is charged with the administration and enforcement of 
the Illinois Act. 1 Under the Act, any takeover offer for a 
target corporation that has substantial connection with Illi-
nois must be registered with the Secretary of State. 2 An 
offer becomes registered 20 business days after the person 
planning to make the offer files a registration statement with 
1 When this litigation began, Alan C. Dixon was the Secretary of State of 
Illinois. 
2 Under the Illinois Act, a take-over offer is defined as: 
"[an] offer to acquire or the acquisition of any equity security of a target 
company, pursuant to a tender offer or request or invitation for tenders, if 
after acquisition the offeror would be, directly or indirectly, a beneficial 
owner of more than 5% of the class of the outstanding equity securities of 
the target company which is the subject of the take-over offer." 
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 1211/2, § 137.52-9 (Cum. Supp. 1980). 
A target company is defined as: 
"a corporation or other issuer of securities (1) of which 10% of the outstand-
ing securities of the class of its equity securities which is the subject of a 
take-over offer is held of record by securityholders located in this State 
... , or (2) which meets any two of the following conditions: 
(a) has its principal executive office in this State; 
(b) is organized under the laws of this State; 
(c) has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus repre-
sented in this State." 
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, § 137.52-10 (Cum. Supp. 1980). 
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the Secretary. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.54(E) (Cum. 
Supp. 1980). During this 20 day period, the Secretary may 
call a hearing when he believes that it is necessary to protect 
the stockholders of the target company. 3 If the Secretary 
does conduct a hearing and concludes that the take-over offer 
fails to provide full and fair disclosure to the target company 
stockholders, or that it is otherwise inequitable, he may deny 
the registration of the offer, or condition its registration upon 
certain modifications. Ill Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, § 137.57 
(Cum. Supp. 1980). The Secretary may issue cease and desist 
orders and seek injunctions restraining violations of the Act. 
In addition, he may file an action for civil remedies and penal-
ties. Private parties may request injunctive relief and civil 
remedies. Willful violations of the Act are subject to crimi-
nal prosecution. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 112. §§ 137.60, 
137.62-137.65 (Cum. Supp. 1980). 
The takeover battle began on January 19, 1979, when Mite 
filed a Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, as required by § 14(d)(l) of the Williams Act, 15 
U. S. C. § 78(n)(d)(1). In its filing, Mite stated that it 
wished to make a cash tender offer for any and all shares of 
Chicago Rivet common stock. It proposed to pay $28.00 per 
share, which at that time represented a premium of approxi-
mately 15% over the market price. On the same day, Mite 
commenced this litigation in the United States District Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Wil-
liams Act and violated the Commerce Clause. Mite also 
asked for a temporary restraining order, and preliminary and 
permanent injunctive relief prohibiting the Illinois Secretary 
of State from enforcing the Illinois Act. 
Chicago Rivet responded by initiating litigation in Pennsyl-
vania, where it conducted most of its business. It sought to 
enjoin Mite from proceeding with its proposed cash tender 
3 The directors or stockholders of the target company may also request 
such a hearing. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 1211/2, § 137.57 (Cum. Supp. 1980). 
80-1188-0PINION 
4 EDGAR v. MITE CORP. 
offer on the ground that Mite's offer violated the Pennsylva-
nia Takeover Disclosure Law. 70 Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 70, 
§711.19 (Purdon Supp. 1978).4 At the same time, Chicago 
Rivet informed the District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois that it was seeking relief in Pennsylvania, and that 
it had no present intention of invoking the Illinois Act. The 
Illinois Secretary of State told the District Court that it had 
not yet decided whether Mite's offer should be exempt from 
the Illinois Act. 5 Relying on these representations, the Dis-
trict Court adjourned proceedings on Mite's motion for a tem-
porary restraining order and preliminary injunctive relief. 
Chicago Rivet's efforts to obtain relief in Pennsylvania 
proved unsuccessful. 6 As a result, both Chicago Rivet and 
the Illinois Secretary of State took steps to invoke the Illinois 
Act. On February 1, 1979, the Secretary of State notified 
Mite of his intention to serve an order requiring Mite to 
• Chicago Rivet filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair 
County, Pa. It alleged that the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law 
(Pennsylvania Act) applied to the tender offer because its principal place of 
business was in Pennsylvania. Chicago Rivet also filed a complaint with 
the Pennsylvania Securities Commission, requesting the Commission to 
enforce the Pennsylvania Act against Mite. On January 23, 1979, Mite re-
moved the Pennsylvania state court action to the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. It also filed a complaint 
seeking a declaratory judgment that the Pennsylvania Act was unconstitu-
tional, and an injunction prohibiting Chicago Rivet and the Pennsylvania 
Securities Commission from enforcing the Act again~t Mite. 
• The Illinois Act provides that the filing requirement does not apply 
where the Secretary has determined that another jurisdiction has statutes 
or rules which "are being applied and which afford protection to security-
holders located in [Illinois] substantially equal to that afforded such 
securityholders by this Act." Ill. Rev. Stat. , ch. 1211/2, § 137.53 (Cum. 
Supp. 1980). 
6 On January 31, 1979, the Pennsylvania Securities Commission decided 
that it would not invoke the Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. The 
next day, the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania denied Chicago Rivet's motion for a temporary restraining 
order. See n. 4, supra. 
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"cease and desist all further action to make a tender offer." 
J.S. App. 36a. Chicago Rivet informed Mite that it would 
file suit in Illinois state court to enjoin the proposed offer. 
Mite immediately renewed its request for injunctive relief in 
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. On 
February 2, the District Court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion restraining Dixon from enforcing the Illinois Act against 
Mite's tender offer for Chicago Rivet. Record 16. 7 It de-
termined that the Illinois Act was probably unconstitutional, 
and that Mite would suffer irreparable injury if forced to 
comply with the Act, because compliance would lead to sub-
stantial delay. 
On February 5, 1979, Mite published its tender offer in the 
Wall Street Journal. The offer was made to all Chicago Riv-
et's shareholders. On the same day, Chicago Rivet made an 
offer for approximately 40% of its own shares at $30.00 per 
share. On February 9, the District Court entered final judg-
ment on Mite's application, declaring that the Illinois Act was 
preempted by the Williams Act, and that it imposed an undue 
burden on interstate commerce. J.S. App. 32a~1a. It also 
permanently enjoined the Secretary of State from enforcing 
the Illinois Act against Mite. J. S. App. 40a. 8 
Several days after final judgment was entered, Mite and 
Chicago Rivet reached an agreement under which both 
tender offers were withdrawn and Mite was given 30 days to 
examine the books and affairs of Chicago Rivet. Under the 
agreement, Mite would either make a tender offer of $31 per 
share on or before March 12, 1979, which Chicago Rivet 
agreed not to oppose, or decide not to "acquire any stock or 
7 The order was cast as a preliminary injunction rather than as a tempo-
rary restraining order to ensure that it would be immediately appealable. 
App. I-9. However, neither the Secretary of State nor Chicago Rivet 
sought interim relief in the Court of Appeals. 
8 Although Mite requested that both the Secretary of State and Chicago 
Rivet be enjoined from taking steps to enforce the Illinois Act, the perma-
nent injunction applied only to the Secretary of State. 
' . 
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assets of Rivet or make any offer to merge, consolidate or 
otherwise acquire Rivet." App. to Brief for Appellees A. 
On March 2, 1979, Mite announced its decision not to make a 
tender offer. 
The Secretary of State subsequently appealed the District 
Court's decision. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit affirmed. In reaching this decision, it 
expressly held that the controversy was not moot. 633 F. 2d 
486, 490 (1980). As we explain below, that conclusion is 
incorrect. 
II 
The jurisdiction of this Court depends on the existence of a 
live controversy. Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 125 (1975); 
SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 
407 (1972). No such controversy exists here. Chicago 
Rivet is not a party to these proceedings and has no interest 
in the outcome of this case; Mite has agreed not to attempt 
another takeover. Nor will the Secretary of State's position 
be affected by resolution of the merits of this case. Even if 
this Court were to hold that the Illinois Act is constitutional 
and lift the permanent injunction that now restrains enforce-
ment of the Act against Mite, there would be no basis for con-
tinued litigation by the Secretary. The Secretary states 
that if the decision below were reversed, he would initiate en-
forcement proceedings against Mite in state court, seeking 
civil and criminal penalties for its failure to comply with the 
Illinois Act. However, a preliminary injunction was in effect 
at the time the alleged violations occurred. This injunction 
bars the Secretary from seeking either civil or criminal penal-
ties for violations of the Act that occurred during that period. 
The Secretary argues that the preliminary injunction 
merely barred him from commencing an enforcement action 
during the period the injunction was in effect. He suggests 
that if this Court were to decide that the statute is constitu-
tional and lift the permanent injunction, the State would be 
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able to commence an action seeking penalties for any viola-
tions that occurred during the period the preliminary injunc-
tion was in effect. In other words, argues the Secretary, the 
preliminary injunction only provided temporary security. It 
enabled Mite to go forward with the tender offer-subject to 
the risk that at some later stage, the constitutionality of the 
statute would be upheld, and the state would commence en-
forcement proceedings. 
Federal courts undoubtedly have the power to issue a pre-
liminary injunction that restrains enforcement of a state stat-
ute, subject to the condition that if the statute is later found 
to be valid, the state is free to seek penalties for violations 
that occurred during the period the injunction was in effect. 
Just as certainly, however, federal courts also have the 
power to issue a preliminary injunction that offers permanent 
protection from penalties for violations of the statute that 
occurred during the period the injunction was in effect. 
Determining whether a particular injunction provides tempo-
rary or permanent protection becomes a question of 
interpretation. 
In the ordinary case, unless the order contains specific lan-
guage to the contrary, it should be presumed that an injunc-
tion secures permanent protection from penalties for viola-
tions that occurred during the period it was in effect; the 
burden should be on the State to show that the injunction 
provided only temporary security. A presumption in favor 
of permanent protection is likely to reflect the intentions of 
the court that granted the motion. In acting upon a request 
for an injunction, it will recognize that short-term protection 
is often only marginally better than no protection at all. 
Parties seek to restrain the enforcement of a state statute, 
not just because they want short-term protection, but be-
cause they desire permanent immunity for actions they take 
in reliance on the injunction. If they are contemplating ac-
tion that might violate a state statute, they will take little so-
' . 
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lace from temporary immunity-when they know that if they 
decide to act, enforcement proceedings might be intitiated at 
some later stage. 9 
Here, the preliminary injunction does not expressly state -fra.-vt fe IVt:<, 1--t/es 
that it provides permanent immunity or violations o e Illi-
nois Act that may occur during its e ective period. The in-
junction provides only that the Secretary of State is enjoined 
from "issuing any cease and desist order or notice of hearing 
or from otherwise invoking, applying, or enforcing the Illi-
nois Business Take-Over Act" against Mite. Record 16. 
However, the Secretary has failed to offer any reasons why 
the presumption in favor of permanent protection should not 
be applied here. In this context, as the District Court must 
have recognized, permanent protection was needed. Mite 
sought an injunction, not just because it desired protection 
from enforcement actions during the period it was actually 
making the tender offer, but also because it desired protec-
tion from such actions in the future. The Act provides for 
substantial civil and criminal penalties. Mite would have I 
been reluctant to go forward with its offer,which entailed 
considerable expense, if there were some risk that it would 
be penalized later. Indeed, in the Schedule 14D-1 filed with 
the SEC, Mite expressly stated that it would not commence 
the tender offer unless it obtained injunctive relief. It also 
9 In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U. S. 452 (1974), the Court indicated that, 
at least in cases involving constitutionally protected activity, the function 
of a preliminary injunction against a state criminal statute is to allow the 
party obtaining the injunction to act without fear of eventual prosecution. 
The Court suggested that injunctive relief would ordinarily be appropriate 
where the applicant for relief is situated "between the Scylla of intention-
ally flouting state law and the Charybdis of foregoing what he believes to 
be constitutionally protected acitivity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed 
in a criminal proceeding." !d., at 462. See also Hygrade Provision Co. v. 
Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 500 (1925); Terrace v. Thompson , 263 U. S. 197, 
216 (1923); Salem Inn, Inc . v. Frank, 501 F. 2d 18, 21 (CA2 1974), aff'd in 
relevant part sub nom. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U. S. 922 (1975). 
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reserved the right to withdraw its offer if injunctive relief 
were initially granted, but later withdrawn. See Record, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 14. 10 
Interpreting the injunction to provide permanent protec-
tion also ensures that Mite will not be penalized for acting in 
reliance on the injunction. 11 Mite went forward with the 
tender offer, reasonably believing that the District Court's 
order provided complete immunity. Under the circum-
stances, it would be improper to permit the State to penalize 
action taken while the injunction was in effect. In the past, \ 
this Court has recognized that reasonable reliance on judicial 
pronouncements may constitute a valid defense to criminal 
prosecution. See, e. g., Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 
188 (1977). 12 
In addition to arguing that the preliminary injunction 
should be interpreted to provide only temporary protection 
from a state enforcement action, the Secretary argues that 
10 We also find it significant that the District Court's final order granting 
a permanent injunction declares that ~he Illinois Act is "null and void and of 
no force and effect." J.S. App. 41a. A reasonable construction of the 
order granting a preliminary injunction is that it was also intended to ren-
der the act "null and void" while the injunction was in effect. 
11 It is relevant to note that, although Mite sought injunctive relief prior 
to engaging in any action that could subject it to civil or criminal penalties, 
the state never sought a stay of the District Court's injunction either in 
that court or in the Court of Appeals, and never expressed an intent to do 
(_~_)-~Marks , a conviction for transporting obscene materials was over-
turned, where the materials were not obscene at time of transportation, 
but were rendered obscene at time of trial by intervening decision of this 
Court. See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 569--571 (1965) (convic-
tion for illegal picketing reversed where defendant had relied on permis-
sion from police officer); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 423, 437-439·(1959) (con-
viction for refusal to testify before state commission reversed because 
witness had relied on opinion of commission chairman that he was privi-
leged to remain silent); United States v. Mancuso, 139 F. 2d 90 (CA3 1943) 
(defendant could not be held liable for ignoring induction notices issued 
while ex parte order staying induction was in effect). 
' . 
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resolution of the mootness issue in this case should be con-
trolled by Leroy v. Great Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 
173 (1979). In that case, Great Western announced its inten-
tion to make a tender offer to purchase stock in another cor-
poration. Idaho officials responsible for administering an 
Idaho statute governing corporate takeovers, see Idaho 
Code, §§ 30--1500 et seq, objected to the offer and delayed its 
effective date. Great Western brought an action in Federal 
District Court, seeking a declaration that the Idaho takeover 
law was unconstitutional, and an injunction restraining Idaho 
officials from enforcing the statute. The District Court 
granted injunctive relief that enabled Great Western to com-
plete the acquisition. This Court, in reviewing the case, 
held that the controversy was not moot. "[T]he question 
whether Great Western has violated Idaho's statute will re-
main open unless and until the District Court's judgment is 
finally affirmed." /d., at 478.13 
Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. is easily distinguish-
able from this case. Unlike Mite, Great Western took ac-
tions that might have violated the state takeover statute be-
fore it obtained injunctive relief. If this Court had decided 
that the Idaho statute was valid, Idaho officials might have 
been able to seek penalties for those pre-injunction viola-
tions.14 Leroy v. Great Western United Corp. can also be 
distinguished on the ground that the takeover offer in that 
case was successful. If the Idaho statute had been found to 
be valid, then Idaho officials would have been able to seek a 
recission of the takeover. 15 Here, since the acquisition was 
13 The Court did not reach the question whether the Idaho statute was 
unconstitutional. It concluded that the action should have been dismissed 
on grounds of improper venue. 
14 See Idaho Code, ch. 5B, §§ 30-1502-1504, 1510. 
'" See Idaho Code, ch. 5B, §§ 30-1514 (allowing state to institute action ) 
for recission). The Illinois Act also empowers the state to seek a court 
order rescinding sales that are unlawful under the Act. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 
121 1/2, § 137.60 (Cum. Supp. 1980). 
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never completed, Illinois officials could not seek recission. 16 
Finally, this case does not fall within the exception to the 
mootness doctrine for cases that "are capable of repetition, 
yet evading review." Unless a class action is involved, that 
exception applies only when the challenged action is too short 
to be fully litigated before its cessation, and when there is a 
reasonable expectation or a demonstrated probability that 
the same complaining party will be subject to the same action 
in the future. Illinois State Board of Elections v. Socialist 
Workers Party, 440 U. S. 173, 187 (1979); Weinstein v. Brad-
ford, 423 U. S. 147, 149 (1975). The second requirement has 
not been satisfied here. Mite has agreed not to renew its ef-
forts to acquire Chicago Rivet. Thus, unless Mite breaches 
its agreement, 17 these particular corporations will never 
again become involved in a dispute over the constitutionality 
of the Illinois Act. Nor will the state ever again have occa-
sion to prevent Mite from making a takeover offer for Chi-
cago Rivet. 18 
There is no danger that the question whether the Illinois 
Act is constitutional will always escape review by this Court, 
16 It is true that a recission action would have been predicated on acts 
that were taken under cover of the preliminary injunction. However, in-
junctions should ordinarily be interpreted only as providing permanent 
protection from penalties. The state should be barred from penalizing the 
offeror for acts that took place during the period the injunction was in ef-
fect. However, if a court determines that the state statute is valid, the 
state should be free to provide a remedy for the continuing effects of acts 
that violated the statute. In particular, a state should be permitted to dis-
mantle a successful acquisition that violated a valid statute. 
17 The possibility that Mite will breach its agreement does not bring this 
case within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception. 
The likelihood that such a breach will occur is relatively small. The· excep-
tion applies only when there is a reasonable expectation that the same ac-
tion will occur in the future. 
18 It is true that Mite may attempt to acquire some corporation other than 
Chicago Rivet, and that Illinois may seek to prevent such an acquisition. 
It is quite possible, however, that the constitutionality of the Illinois Act 
would be reviewable at that time. See text accompanying note 19 infra. 
' . 
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even in cases involving other corporations. The offeror cor-
poration might fail to obtain an injunction before commencing 
the tender offer, so that its actions prior to the injunction 
could be the subject of an enforcement proceeding. 19 Even if 
injunctive relief conferring complete immunity were obtained 
before the offeror commenced its takeover bid, the tender of-
fer might not end as it did here, with an agreement between 
teh offeror and the target that there would be no further 
takeover attempt. If the takeover efforts might be re-
newed, then a live controversy between the offeror and the I 
target would remain. A live controversy might also remain 
if the takeover offer were successful. In such a case, if the 
statute were later found to be constitutional, then the state 
~ be able to seek a recission of the acquisition. 
III 
The parties to this appeal have no adversary interest in the 
resolution of the merits of this controversy. Because the 
case is moot, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Ap-
peals. The Court of Appeals should remand the case to the 
District Court with instructions to dismiss. 
19 The constitutionality of the Act might also be reviewable if the court 
grants an injunction subject to the condition that if the state is later found 
to be valid, the state may seek peanlties for any violations that took place 
during the period the injunction was in effect. 
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80-1188: Edgar v. Mite 
Justice Powell, concurring in part. 
I agree with Justice Marshall that this case is 
moot. In view, however, of the decision of a majority of 
the Court to reach the merits, I join Parts I, II, and VB 
of the Court's opinion. In my view, the remainder of the 
Court's opinion is unnecessary for the resolution of this 
case. 
-
February 18, 1982 
R0-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear Thurgood: 
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Re: 80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corp. 
Dear Byron: 
As presently advised, I expect to join Part V of 
your op1n1on. I agree with you that when Congress 
enacted the Williams Act, it took extreme care to avoid 
tipping the scales either in favor of management or in 
favor of possible takeovers. However, it seems to me 
that there is a significant difference between adopting 
such a policy of neutrality with respect to federal 
legislation that Congress was enacting, and requiring 
states to follow the same· policy. As of now, I am not 
persuaded that Congress intended to prevent the states 
from loading the scales one way or the other. You are, 
of course, dead right in your analysis of the Illinois 
statute as being loaded in favor of management. 
I also am still not sure we do not need to address 
mootness quest i on more thorou h ly because if the 
i c 10n were a complete defense~o c1v1l or crim1nal 
p-enalt ies, I s houl d" t l'il n 1s case mld be m.::::.o .::::.o-=--.=.o.o·-
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Dear Byron, 
I will see what John's dissent says before 
deciding what to join in this case. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1188 
JAMES EDGAR, APPELLANT v. MITE CORPORATION 
AND MITE HOLDINGS, INC. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is whether the Illinois Business Take-
Over Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.51, et seq. (Supp. 
1980), is unconstitutional under the Supremacy and Com-
merce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. 
I 
Appellee MITE Corporation and its wholly-owned subsid-
iary, MITE Holdings, Inc., are corporations organized under 
the laws of Delaware with their principal executive offices in 
Connecticut. Appellant James Edgar is the Secretary of 
State of Illinois and is charged with the administration and 
enforcement of the Illinois Act. Under the Illinois Act any 
takeover offer 1 for the shares of a corporation must be regis-
tered with the Secretary of State if 10% of the class of equity 
'The Illino's Act defines "take-over offer" as "the offer to acquire or the 
acquisition of any equity security of a target company pursuant to a tender 
offer .... " Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, § 137.52-9 (Supp. 1980). "A 
tender offer has been conventionally understood to be a publicly made invi-
tation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares 
for sale at a specified price." Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender 
Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250, 
1251 (1973). The terms "tender offer" and "takeover offer" are often used 
interchangeably. 
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securities subject to the offer are owned by shareholders re-
siding in Illinois or if any two of the following conditions are 
met: the corporation has its principal executive office in Illi-
nois, is organized under the laws of Illinois, or has at least 
10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented 
within the state. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.52-9 and 
10 (Supp. 1980). An offer becomes registered 20 days after a 
registration statement is filed with the Secretary unless the 
Secretary calls a hearing. Id., at § 137.54(E). The Secre-
tary may call a hearing at any time during the 20-day waiting 
period to adjudicate the substantive fairness of the offer if he 
believes it is necessary to protect the shareholders of the tar-
get company, and a hearing must be held if requested by a 
majority of a target company's outside directors or by Illinois 
shareholders who own 10% of the class of securities subject to 
the offer. !d., at§ 137.57(A). If the Secretary does hold a 
hearing, he is directed by the statute to deny registration to a 
tender offer if he finds that it "fails to provide full and fair 
disclosure to the offerees of all material information concern-
ing the take-over, or that the take-over offer is inequitable or 
would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon the 
offerees .... " !d., at§ 137.57.E. 
On January 19, 1979, MITE initiated a cash tender offer for 
all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet and Machine Co., a 
publicly held Illinois corporation, by filing a Schedule 14D-1 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to 
comply with the Williams Act. 2 The Schedule 14D-1 indi-
' The Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454, et seq., codified at 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f), added new sections 13(d), 13(e) and 14(d)-(f) 
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 14(d)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act requires an offeror seeking to acquire more than five per-
cent of any class of equity security by means of a tender offer to first file a 
Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The 
Schedule requires disclosure of the source of funds used to purchase the 
target shares, past transctions with the target company, and other mate-
rial financial information about the offeror. In addition, the offeror must 
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cated that MITE was willing to pay $28.00 per share for any 
and all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet, a premium of ap-
proximately $4.00 over the then-prevailing market price. 
MITE did not comply with the Illinois Act, however, and 
commenced this litigation on the same day by filing an action 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois. The complaint asked for a declaratory judgment 
that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and 
violated the Commerce Clause. In addition, MITE sought a 
temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent 
injunctions prohibiting the Illinois Secretary of State from 
enforcing the Illinois Act. 
Chicago Rivet responded three days later by bringing suit 
in Pennsylvania, where it conducted most of its business, 
seeking to enjoin MITE from proceeding with its proposed 
tender offer on the ground that the offer violated the Penn-
sylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, 70 Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 
70, § 711.19 (Supp. 1978). After MITE's efforts to obtain re-
lief in Pennsylvania proved unsuccessful, 3 both Chicago 
disclose any antitrust or other legal problems which might result from the 
success of the offer. 17 CFR § 240.14d-100 (1981). Section 14(d)(1) re-
quires the offeror to publish or send a statement of the relevant facts con-
tained in the Schedule 14D-1 to the shareholders of the target company. 
In addition, § 13(d), also added by the Williams Act, requires a purchaser 
of any equity security registered pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U. S. C. § 781, to file a schedule 13D with the Commission 
within ten days after its purchases have exceeded five percent of the out-
standing shares of the security. Schedule 13D requires essentially the 
same disclosures as required by Schedule 14D-1. Compare 17 CFR 
§ 240.13d-101 (1981) with 17 CFR § 240.14d-100 (1981). 
3 In addition to filing suit in state court, Chicago Rivet filed a complaint 
with the Pennsylvania Securities Commission requesting the Commission 
to enforce the Pennsylvania Act against MITE. On January 31, 1979 the 
Pennsylvania Securities Commission decided that it would not invoke the 
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. The next day, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to which MITE 
had removed the state court action, denied Chicago Rivet's motion for a 
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Rivet and the Illinois Secretary of State took steps to invoke 
the Illinois Act. On February 1, 1979, the Secretary of 
State notified MITE that he intended to issue an order re-
quiring it to cease and desist further efforts to make a tender 
offer for Chicago Rivet. On February 2, 1979 Chicago Rivet 
notified MITE by letter that it would file suit in Illinois state 
court to enjoin the proposed tender offer. MITE renewed 
its request for injunctive relief in the District Court and on 
February 2 the District Court issued a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting the Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois 
Act against MITE's tender offer for Chicago Rivet. 
MITE then published its tender offer in the February 5 
edition of the Wall Street Journal. The offer was made to all 
shareholders of Chicago Rivet residing throughout the 
United States. The outstanding stock was worth over $23 
million at the offering price. On the same day Chicago Rivet 
made an offer for approximately 40% of its own shares at 
$30.00 per share. 4 The District Court entered final judg-
ment on February 9, declaring that the Illinois Act was pre-
empted by the Williams Act and that it violated the Com-
merce Clause. Accordingly, the District Court permanently 
enjoined enforcement of the Illinois statute against MITE. 
Shortly after final judgment was entered, MITE and Chicago 
Rivet entered into an agreement whereby both tender offers 
were withdrawn and MITE was given 30 days to examine the 
books and records of Chicago Rivet. Under the agreement 
MITE was either to make a tender offer of $31.00 per share 
before March 12, 1979, which Chicago Rivet agreed not to op-
pose, or decide not to acquire Chicago Rivet's share or as-
sets. App. to Brief for Appellees 1a-4a. On March 2, 1979, 
MITE announced its decision not to make a tender offer. 
temporary restraining order. 
' Chicago Rivet's offer for its own shares was exempt from the require-
ments of the Illinois Act pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat. , ch. 121 1/2, 
§ 137.52-9(4) (Supp. 1980). 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed sub nom. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F. 2d 486 
(1980). It agreed with the District Court that several provi-
sions of the Illinois Act are preempted by the Williams Act 
and that the Illinois Act unduly burdens interstate commerce 
in violation of the Commerce Clause. We noted probable ju-
risdiction, 451 U. S. 968 (1981), and now affirm. 
II 
The Court of Appeals specifically found that this case was 
not moot, 633 F. 2d, at 490, reasoning that because the Secre-
tary has indicated he intends to enforce the Act against 
MITE, a reversal of the judgment of the District Court would 
expose MITE to civil and criminal liability • for making the 
February 5, 1979 offer in violation of the Illinois Act. We 
agree. It is urged that the preliminary injunction issued by 
the District Court is a complete defense to civil or criminal 
penalties. While that is not a frivolous question by any 
means, it is an issue to be decided when and if the Secretary 
of State initiates an action. That action would be foreclosed 
if we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Illinois Act is 
unconstitutional. Accordingly, the case is not moot. 
III 
We first address the holding that the Illinois Takeover Act 
is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. We note at 
the outset that in passing the Williams Act, which is an 
amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Con-
gress did not also amend § 28(a) of the 1934 Act. 6 In perti-
nent part, § 28(a) provides as follows: 
5 The Secretary of State may bring an action for civil penalties for viola-
tions of the Illinois Act., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.65 (Supp. 1980), 
and a person who willfully violates the Act is subject to criminal prosecu-
tion. Id. , at § 137.63. 
6 There is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress was 
aware of state takeover laws when it enacted the Williams Act. When the 
6 
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"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of 
the Securities Commission (or any agency or officer per-
forming like functions) of any state over any security or 
any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provi-
sions of this chapter or the rules and regulations 
thereunder." 
Thus Congress did not explicitly prohibit states from regulat-
ing takeovers; it left the determination whether the Illinois 
statute conflicts with the Williams Act to the courts. Of 
course, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually 
conflicts with a valid federal statute; and, 
"[a] conflict will be found 'where compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility 
.. . ,'Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 
373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the state 'law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941); Jones v. 
Rath Packing Co., supra, at 526, 540-541. Accord, De 
Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 363 (2976)." Ray v. At-
lantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 158 (1978). 
Our inquiry is further narrowed in this case since there is no 
contention that it would be impossible to comply with both 
the provisions of the Williams Act and the more burdensome 
requirements of the Illinois law. The issue thus is, as it was 
in the Court of Appeals, whether the Illinois Act frustrates 
the objectives of the Williams Act in some substantial way. 
The Williams Act, passed in 1968, was the congressional 
Williams Act was enacted in 1968, only Virginia had a takeover statute. 
The Virginia statute, Va. Code§ 131-528, became effective March 5, 1968; 
the Williams Act was enacted several months later on July 19, 1968. 
Takeover statutes are now in effect in 37 states. Sargent, On the Validity 
of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 
Ohio St. L. J. 689, 690 n. 7 (1981). 
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response to the increased use of cash tender offers in corpo-
rate acquisitions, a device that had "removed a substantial 
number of corporate control contests from the reach of the 
exsiting disclosure requirements of the federal securities 
laws." Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U. S. 1, 22 
(1977). The Williams Act filled this regulatory gap. The 
Act imposes several requirements. First, it requires that 
upon the commencement of the tender offer, the offeror file 
with the SEC, publish or send to the shareholders of the tar-
get company, and furnish to the target company detailed in-
formation about the offer. 15 U. S. C. § 78(n)(d)(1), 17 CFR 
§ 240.24d-3 (1981). The offeror must disclose information 
about its background and identity; the source of the funds to 
be used in making the purchase; the purpose of the purchase, 
including any plans to liquidate the company or make major 
changes in its corporate structure; and the extent of the 
offeror's holdings in the target company. 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78m(d)(1), 17 CFR § 240.13d-1 (1981). See also note 2, 
supra. Second, stockholders who tender their shares may 
withdraw them during the first seven days of a tender offer 
and if the offeror has not yet purchased their shares, at any 
time after sixty days from the commencement of the offer. 
15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5). 7 Third, all shares tendered must be 
purchased for the same price; if an offering price is increased, 
those who have already tendered receive the benefit of the 
increase. 15 U.S. C. §78n(d)(7). 8 
7 The seven-day withdrawal period contained in the Williams Act has 
been extended to 15 business days by the Commission. 17 CFR 
§ 240.14d-7(a)(1). 
8 The Williams Act also provides that when the number of shares ten-
dered exceeds the number of shares sought in the offer, those shares ten-
dered during the first 10 days of the offer must be purchased on a pro rata 
basis. 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(6). The Act also contains a general antifraud 
provision, 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e), which has been interpreted to require dis-
closure of material information known to the offeror even if disclosure was 
not otherwise required. See, e. g. Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Welling-
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There is no question that in imposing these requirements, 
Congress intended to protect investors. Piper v. Chris-
Craft Industries, supra, at 35; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper 
Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 58 (1975); S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2 (1967) ("Senate Report"). But it is also crystal 
clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor 
was to avoid favoring of either management or the takeover 
bidder. As we noted in Piper, the disclosure provisions 
originally embodied in S.2731 "were avowedly pro-manage-
ment in the target company's efforts to defeat takeover 
bids." 430 U. S. , at 30. But Congress became convinced 
"that takeover bids should not be discouraged because they 
serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but 
inefficient management." Senate Report at 3. 9 It also be-
came apparent that entrenched management was often suc-
cessful in defeating takeover attempts. As the legislation 
evolved, therefore, Congress disclaimed any "intention to 
provide a weapon for management to discourage takeover 
bids ... " Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58, 
and expressly embraced a policy of neutrality. As Senator 
Williams explained, "We have taken extreme care to avoid 
tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of 
the persons making the takeover bids." 113 Cong. Rec. 
24664 (1967). This policy of "evenhandedness", Piper v. 
Chris-Craft Industries, supra, at 31, represented a convic-
tion that neither side in the contest should be extended addi-
tional advantages vis-a-vis the investor, who if furnished 
with adequate information would be in a position to make his 
own informed choice. We, therefore, agree with the Court 
of Appeals that Congress sought to protect the investor not 
ton Associates, 483 F. 2d 247, 250 (CA 2 1973). 
9 Congress also did not want to deny shareholders "the opportunities 
which result from the competitive bidding for a block of stock of a given 
company", namely the opportunity to sell shares for a premium over their 
market price. 113 Cong. Rec. 24665 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits). 
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only by furnishing him with the necessary information but 
also by withholding from management or the bidder any un-
due advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an in-
formed choice. 633 F. 2d, at 496. 
To implement this policy of investor protection while main-
taining the balance between management and the bidder, 
Congress required the latter to file with the Commission and 
furnish the company and the investor with all information ad-
equate to the occasion. With that filing, the offer could go 
forward, stock could be tendered and purchased, but a stock-
holder was free within a specified time to withdraw his ten-
dered shares. He was also protected if the offer was in-
creased. Looking at this history as a whole, it appears to us, 
as it did to the Court of Appeals, that Congress intended to 
strike a balance between the investor, management and the 
takeover bidder. The bidder was to furnish the investor and 
the target company with adequate information but there was 
no "intention to do ... more than give incumbent manage-
ment an opportunity to express and explain its position." 
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58. Once that 
opportunity was extended, Congress anticipated that the in-
vestor, if he so chose, and the takeover bidder should be free 
to move forward within the time-frame provided by 
Congress. 
IV 
The Court of Appeals identified three provisions of the Illi-
nois Act that upset the careful balance struck by Congress 
and which therefore stand as obstacles to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals in all essential respects. 
A 
The Illinois Act requires a tender offeror to notify the Sec-
retary of State and the target company of its intent to make a 
tender offer and the material terms of the offer twenty busi-
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ness days before the offer becomes effective. Ill. Rev. Stat., 
ch. 121 112, §§ 137.54E, 137.54B (Supp. 1980.) During that 
time, the offeror may not communicate its offer to the share-
holders, id., at § 137.54A. Meanwhile, the target company 
is free to disseminate information to its shareholders concern-
ing the impending offer. The contrast with the Williams Act 
is apparent. Under that Act, there is no pre-commencement 
notification requirement; the critical date is the date a tender 
offer is "first published or sent or given to security holders." 
15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(l). See also 17 CFR § 240.14d-2 (1981). 
We agree with with the Court of Appeals that by providing 
the target company with additional time within which to take 
steps to combat the offer, the precommencement notification 
provisions furnish incumbent management with a powerful 
tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the 
stockholders who will not have an offer before them during 
this period. 10 These consequences are precisely what Con-
gress determined should be avoided, and for this reason, the 
precommencement notification provision frustrates the objec-
tives of the Williams Act. 
It is important to note in this respect that in the course of 
· events leading to the adoption of the Williams Act, Congress 
several times refused to impose a precommencement disclo-
sure requirement. In October 1965, Senator Williams intro-
duced S.2731, a bill which would have required a bidder to 
notify the target company and file a public statement with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission at least 20 days be-
fore commencement of a cash tender offer for more than five 
per cent of a class of the target company's securities. 111 
Cong. Rec. 28259 (1965). The Commission commented on 
the bill and stated that "the requirement of a 20-day advance 
notice to the issuer and the Commission is unnecessary for 
the protection of security holders ... " 112 Cong. Rec. 
10 See note 11 and accompanying text, infra. 
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190005 (1966). Senator Williams introduced a new bill in 
1967, S.510, which provided for a confidential filing by the 
tender offeror with the Commission five days prior to the 
commencement of the offer. S.510 was enacted as the Wil-
liams Act after elimination of the advance disclosure require-
ment. As the Senate Report explained, 
"At the hearings it was urged that this prior review was 
not necessary and in some cases might delay the offer 
when time was of the essence. In view of the authority 
and responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to take appropriate action in the event that inad-
equate or misleading information is disseminated to the 
public to solicit acceptance of a tender offer, the bill as 
approved by the committee requires only that the state-
ment be on file with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission at the time the tender offer is first made to the 
public." Senate Report at 4. 
Congress rejected another pre-commencement notification 
proposal during deliberations on the 1970 amendments to the 
Williams Act. 11 
11 H. R. 4285, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The bill was not reported out 
of the subcommittee. Instead, the Senate amendments to the Williams 
Act, which did not contain pre-commencement notification provisions, 
were adopted. Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated detailed 
rules governing the conduct of tender offers. Rule 14d-2(b), 17 CFR 
§ 240.14d-2(b) (1981), requires that a tender offeror make its offer effective 
within five days of publicly announcing the material terms of the offer by 
disseminating specified information to shareholders and filing the requisite 
documents with the Commission. Otherwise the offeror must announce 
that it is withdrawing its offer. The events in this litigation took place 
prior to the effective date of Rule 14d-2(b), and because Rule 14d-2(b) op-
erates prospectively only, see 44 Fed. Reg. 70326 (1979), it is not at issue 
in this case. 
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B 
For similar reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeals 
that the hearing provisions of the Illinois Act frustrate the 
congressional purpose by introducing extended delay into the 
tender offer process. The Illinois Act allows the Secretary 
of State to call a hearing with respect to any tender offer sub-
ject to the Act, and the offer may not proceed until the hear-
ing is completed. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, §§ 137.57A and 
B. (Supp. 1980) The Secretary may call a hearing at any 
time prior to the commencement of the offer, and there is no 
deadline for the completion of the hearing. /d., at 
§§ 137.57C and D. Although the Secretary is to render a de-
cision within 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing, that 
period may be extended without limitation. Not only does 
the Secretary of State have the power to delay a tender offer 
indefinitely, but incumbent management may also use the 
hearing provisions of the Illinois Act to delay a tender offer. 
The Secretary is required to call a hearing if requested to do 
so by, among other persons, those who are located in Illinois 
"as determined by post office address as shown on the 
records of the target company and who hold of record or ben-
eficially, or both, at least 10% of the outstanding shares of 
any class of equity securities which is the subject of the take-
over offer." /d., at § 137.57.A. Since incumbent manage-
ment in many cases will control, either directly or indirectly, 
10% of the target company's shares, this provision allows 
management to delay the commencement of an offer by in-
sisting on a hearing. As the Court of Appeals observed, 
these provisions potentially afford management a "powerful 
weapon to stymie indefinitely a takeover." 633 F. 2d, at 
494. 12 In enacting the Williams Act, Congress itself "recog-
12 Delay has been characterized as "the most potent weapon in a tender 
offer fight." Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Ef-
fects, and Political Competency, 62 Cornell L. Q. 213, 238 (1977). See also 
Wachtel!, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. L. 1433, 
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nized that delay can seriously impede a tender offer" and 
sought to avoid it. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 
577 F. 2d 1256, 1277 (CA5 1978); Senate Report at 4. 13 
Congress reemphasized the consequences of delay when it 
enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 
Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 15 U. S. C. 12, et seq. 
"[I]t is clear that this short waiting period [the ten-day 
period for proration provided for by § 14(d)(6) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act, which applies only after a tender 
offer is commenced] was founded on congressional con-
cern that a longer delay might unduly favor the target 
firm's incumbent management, and permit them to frus-
trate many pro-competitive cash tenders. This ten-day 
waiting period thus underscores the basic purpose of the 
Williams Act-to maintain a neutral policy towards cash 
tender offers, by avoiding lengthy delays that might dis-
courage their chances for success." H. R. Rep. No. 
94-1373, 94th Gong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976). 14 
1437-1442 (1977); Wilner and Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover 
Laws and Their Constitutionality, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 9--10 (1976). 
13 According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, delay enables 
a target company to: 
"(1) repurchase its own securities; 
"(2) announce dividend increases or stock splits; 
"(3) issue additional shares of stock; 
"(4) acquire other companies to produce an antitrust violation should the 
tender offer succeed; 
"(5) arrange a defensive merger; 
"(6) enter into restrictive loan agreements, 
"(7) institute litigation challenging the tender offer." Brief for the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae 10, n. 8. 
14 Representative Rodino set out the consequences of delay in greater 
detail when he described the relationship between the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Act and the Williams Act: 
"In the case of cash tender offers, more so than in other mergers, the equi-
ties include time and the danger of undue delay. This bill in no way in-
tends to repeal or reverse the congresional purpose underlying the 1968 
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As we have said, Congress anticipated investors and the 
takeover offeror be free to go forward without unreasonable 
delay. The potential for delay provided by the hearing pro-
visions upset the balance struck by Congress by favoring 
management at the expense of stockholders. We therefore 
agree with the Court of Appeals that these hearing provi-
sions conflict with the Williams Act. 
c 
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Illinois Act is 
pre-empted by the Williams Act insofar as it allows the Sec-
retary of State of Illinois to pass on the substantive fairness 
of a tender offer. Under § 137.57E of the Illinois law, the 
Secretary is required to deny registration of a takeover offer 
if he finds that the offer "fails to provide full and fair disclo-
sure to the offerees . . . or that the take-over offer is inequita-
ble . . . . " (Emphasis added). '5 The Court of Appeals un-
derstood the Williams Act and its legislative history to 
indicate that Congress intended for investors to be free to 
Williams Act, or the 1970 amendments to that act. . . . Lengthier delays 
will give the target firm plenty of time to defeat the offer, by abolishing 
cumulative voting, arranging a speedy defense merger, quickly incorporat-
ing in a State with an antitakeover statute or negotiating costly lifetime 
employment contracts for incumbent man< _£ement. And the longer the 
waiting period, the more the target's stock may be bid up in the market, 
making the offer more costly-and less successful. Should this happen, it 
will mean that shareholders of the target firm will be effectively deprived 
of the choice that cash tenders give to them: Either accept the offer and 
thereby gain the tendered premium, or reject the offer. Generally, the 
courts have construed the Williams Act so as to maintain these two options 
for the target company's shareholders, and the House conferees contem-
plate that the courts will continue to do so. " 122 Cong. Rec. 30877 (1976). 
16 Appellant argues that the Illinois Act does not permit him to ajudicate 
the substantive fairness of a tender offer. Brief for Appellant 21-22. On 
this state-law issue, however, we follow the view of the Court of Appeals 
that § 137.57.E allows the Secretary of State "to pass upon the substantive 
fairness of a tender offer .. . . " 633 F. 2d, at 493. 
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make their own decisions. We agree. Both the House and 
Senate Reports observed that the Act was designed to "make 
the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair 
opportunity to make their decision." H. R. Rep. No. 1711, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968); Senate Report at 3. Thus, as 
the Court of Appeals said, "the state thus offers investor pro-
tection at the expense of investor autonomy-an approach 
quite in conflict with that adopted by Congress." 633 F. 2d, 
at 494. 
v 
The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have 
Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several 
states." U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "[A]t least since 
Cooley v. Board ofWardens, 12 How. 299 (1852), it has been 
clear that 'the Commerce Clause. . . . even without imple-
menting legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the 
power of the States."' Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366, 370-371 (1976), quoting Freeman v. 
Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). See also Lewis v. BT In-
vestment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 35 (1980). Not 
every exercise of state power with some impact on interstate 
commerce is invalid. A state statute must be upheld if it 
"regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local pub-
lic intere t, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental ... unless the burden imposed on such commerce 
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 141 (1970), citing 
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 443 (1960). 
The Commerce Clause, however, permits only incidental 
regulation of interstate commerce by the states; direct regu-
lation is prohibited. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 
U. S. 189, 199 (1925). See also, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 
supra, at 142. The Illinois Act violates these principles for 
two reasons. First, it directly regulates and prevents, un- I 
less its terms are satisfied, interstate tender offers which in \ 
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turn would generate interstate transactions. Second, the f 
burden the Act imposes on interstate commerce is excessive 
in light of the local interests the Act purports to further. 
A 
States have traditionally regulated intrastate securities 
transactions, 16 and this Court has upheld the authority of 
states to enact "blue-sky" laws against Commerce Clause 
challenges on several occasions. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 
242 U. S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards 
Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 
242 U. S. 568 (1917). The Court's rationale for upholding 
the state laws was that the laws only regulated transactions 
occurring within the regulated states. "The provisions of 
the law . . . apply to dispositions of securities within the 
State and while information of those issued in other States 
and foreign countries is required to be filed . . . they are only 
affected by the requirement of a license of one who deals with 
them within the State. . . . Such regulations affect inter-
state commerce in securities only incidentally." Hall v. Gei-
ger-Jones Co., supra, at 557-558 (cites omitted). Congress 
has also recognized the validity of such laws governing intra-
state securities transactions in § 28a of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(a), a provision "designed to 
save state blue-sky laws from preemption." Leroy v. Great 
Western Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 182, n. 13 (1979). 
The Illinois Act differs substantially from state blue-sky 
laws in that it directly regulates transactions which take 
place across state lines, even if wholly outside the State of 
Illinois. A tender offer for securities of a publicly-held orga-
nization is ordinarily communicated by the use of the mails or \ 
other means of interstate commerce to shareholders across 
16 For example, the Illinois Blue Sky law, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 112, 
§ 137.1, et seq. (Supp. 1980), provides that securities subject to the law 
must be registered "prior to sale in this State .. . " !d. , at§ 137.5. 
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the country and abroad. Securities are tendered and trans-
actions closed by similar means. Thus, in this case, Mite 
Corporation, the tender offeror, is a Delaware corporation 
with principal offices in Connecticut. Chicago Rivet is a 
publicly-held Illinois corporation with shareholders scattered 
around the country, 27% of whom live in Illinois. Mite's 
offer to Chicago Rivet's shareholders, including those in Illi-
nois, necessarily employed interstate facilities in communi-
cating its offer, which, if accepted, would result in transac-
tions occurring across state lines. These transactions would 
themselves be interstate commerce. Yet the Illinois law, 
unless complied with, sought to prevent Mite from making its 
offer and concluding interstate transactions not only with 
Chicago Rivet's stockholders living in Illinois, but also with 
those living in other states and having no connection with Illi-
nois. Indeed, the Illinois law on its face would apply even if 
not a single one of Chicago Rivet's shareholders were a resi-
dent of Illinois, since the Act applies to every tender offer for 
a corporation meeting two of the following conditions: the 
corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is or-
ganized under Illinois laws, or has at least 10% of its stated 
capital and paid-in surplus represented in Illinois. Ill. Rev. 
Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.52-10.(2) (Supp. 1980). Thus the Act 
could be applied to regulate a tender offer which would not 
affect a single Illinois shareholder. 
It is therefore apparent that the Illinois statute is a direct 
restraint on interstate commerce and that it has a sweeping 
extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, if Illinois may impose 
such regulations, so may other states; and interstate com-
merce in securities transactions generated by tender offers 
would be thoroughly stifled. In Shafer v. Farmers Grain 
Co., supra, at 199, the Court held that "a state statute which 
by its necessary operation directly interferes with or burdens 
. . . [interstate] commerce is a prohibited regulation and 
invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it was enacted." 
See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 
80-1188-0PINION 
18 EDGAR v. MITE CORP. 
806 (1976). The Commerce Clause also precludes the applica-
tion of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly 
outside of the state's borders, whether or not the commerce 
has effects within the state. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Ari-
zona, 325 U. S. 761, 775 (1945), the Court struck down on 
Commerce Clause grounds a state law where the "practical 
effect of such regulation is to control ... [conduct] beyond 
the boundaries of the state .... " The limits on a state's 
power to enact substantive legislation are similar to the lim-
its on the jurisdiction of state courts. In either case, "any 
attempt 'directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
persons or property would offend sister States and exceed 
the inherent limits of the State's power." Shafer v. Heitner, 
433 u. s. 186, 197 (1977). 
Because the Illinois Act purports to regulate directly and 
to interdict interstate commerce, including commerce wholly 
outside the state, it must be held invalid as were the laws at 
issue in Shafer and Southern Pacific. 
B 
The Illinois Act is also unconstitutional under the test of 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S., at 142, for even when 
a state statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the 
burden imposed on that commerce must not be excessive in 
relation to the local interests served by the statute. The 
most obvious burden the Illinois Act imposes on interstate 
commerce arises from the statute's previously-described na-
tionwide reach which purports to give Illinois the power to 
determine whether a tender offer may proceed anywhere. 
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to 
block a nationwide tender offer are substantial. Sharehold-
ers are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a 
premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their 
highest-valued use, a process which can improve efficiency 
and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer 
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mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well 
so that stock prices remain high is reduced. See 
Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 
1161, 117~1174 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market 
Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regula-
tion of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 
(1978); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1373, 94th Gong., 2d Sess. 12 
(1976). 
Appellant claims the Illinois Act furthers two legitimate 
local interests. He argues that Illinois seeks to protect resi-
dent security holders and that the Act merely regulates the 
internal affairs of companies incorporated under Illinois law. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that these asserted in-
terests are insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois im-
poses on interstate commerce. 
While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state 
objective, the state has no legitimate interest in protecting 
non-resident shareholders. Insofar as the Illinois law bur-
dens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed 
in the balance to sustain the law. We note, furthermore, 
that the Act completely exempts from coverage a corpora-
tion's acquisition of its own shares. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 
112, § 137.52.09(4). Thus Chicago Rivet was able to make a 
competing tender offer for its own stock without complying 
with the Illinois Act, leaving Chicago Rivet's shareholders to 
depend only on the protections afforded them by federal se-
curities law, protections which Illinois views as inadequate to 
protect investors in other contexts. This distinction is at 
variance with Illinois' asserted legislative purpose, and tends 
to undermine appellant's justification for the burdens the 
statute imposes on interstate commerce. 
We are also unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially 
enhances the shareholders' position. The Illinois Act seeks 
to protect shareholders of a company subject to a tender offer 
by requiring disclosures regarding the offer, assuring that 
80-1188--0PINION 
20 EDGAR v. MITE CORP. 
shareholders have adequate time to decide whether to tender 
their shares, and according shareholders withdrawal, prora-
tion and equal consideration rights. However, the Williams 
Act provides these same substantive protections, compare 
Ill. Rev. Ann. Stat., ch. 121112, §§ 137.59.C, D, and E (Supp. 
1980) (withdrawal, proration, and equal consideration rights) 
with 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5), (6) and (7) and 17 CFR 
§ 240.14d-7 (same). As the Court of Appeals noted, the dis-
closures required by the Illinois Act which go beyond those 
mandated by the Williams Act and the regulations pursuant 
to it may not substantially enhance the shareholders' ability 
to make informed decisions. 633 F. 2d, at 500. It also was 
of the view that the possible benefits of the potential delays 
required by the Act may be outweighed by the increased risk 
that the tender offer will fail due to defensive tactics em-
ployed by incumbent management. We are unprepared to 
disagree with the Court of Appeals in these respects, and 
conclude that the protections the Illinois Act affords resident 
security holders are, for the most part, speculative. 
Appellant also contends that Illinois has an interest in 
regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated 
under its laws. The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of 
laws principle which recognizes that only one state should 
have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal af-
fairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or be-
tween the corporation and its current officers, directors, and 
shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be 
faced with conflicting demands. See Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws, § 302, Comment b at 307-308 (1971). 
That doctrine is of little use to the state in this context. 
Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders 
to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal 
affairs of the target company. Great Western United Corp. 
v. Kidwell, 577 F. 2d 1256, 1280 n. 3 (1978); Restatement, 
supra, § 302, comment e at 310. Furthermore, the proposed 
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justification is somewhat incredible since the Illinois Act ap-
plies to tender offers for any corporation for which 10% of the 
outstanding shares are held by Illinois residents, Ill. Rev. 
Stat., ch. 121 112, § 137.52-10 (Supp. 1980). The Act thus 
applies to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois 
and have their principal place of business in other states. Il-
linois has no interest in regulating the internal affairs of for-
eign corporations. 
We conclude with the Court of Appeals that the Illinois Act 
imposes a substantial on interstate commerce which out-
weighs its putative local benefits. It is accordingly invalid 
under the Commerce Clause. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 80-1188 
JAMES EDGAR, APPELLANT v. MITE CORPORATION 
AND MITE HOLDINGS, INC. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
[June-, 1982] 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is whether the Illinois Business Take-
Over Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.51, et seq. (Supp. 
1980), is unconstitutional under the Supremacy and Com-
merce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. 
I 
Appellee MITE Corporation and its wholly-owned subsid-
iary, MITE Holdings, Inc., are corporations organized under 
the laws of Delaware with their principal executive offices in 
Connecticut. Appellant James Edgar is the Secretary of 
State of Illinois and is charged with the administration and 
enforcement of the Illinois Act. Under the Illinois Act any 
takeover offer 1 for the shares of a target company must be 
registered with the Secretary of State. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 
1 The Illinois Act defines "take-over offer'' as "the offer to acquire or the 
acquisition of any equity security of a target company, pursuant to a tender 
offer .... " Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 1/2, § 137.52-9 (Supp. 1980). "A 
tender offer has been conventionally understood to be a publicly made invi-
tation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares 
for sale at a specified price." Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender 
Offer'' Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250, 
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121 112, § 137.54.A (Supp. 1980). A target company is de-
fined as a corporation or other issuer of securities of which 
shareholders located in Illinois own 10% of the class of equity 
securities subject to the offer, or for which any two of the fol-
lowing three conditions are met: the corporation has its prin-
cipal executive office in Illinois, is organized under the laws 
of Illinois, or has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in 
surplus represented within the state. Id., at § 137.52-10. 
An offer becomes registered 20 days after a registration 
statement is filed with the Secretary unless the Secretary 
calls a hearing. Id., at§ 137.54.E. The Secretary may call 
a hearing at any time during the 20-day waiting period to ad-
judicate the substantive fairness of the offer if he believes it 
is necessary to protect the shareholders of the target com-
pany, and a hearing must be held if requested by a majority 
of a target company's outside directors or by Illinois share-
holders who own 10% of the class of securities subject to the 
offer. !d., at§ 137.57.A. If the Secretary does hold a hear-
ing, he is directed by the statute to deny registration to a 
tender offer if he finds that it "fails to provide full and fair 
disclosure to the offerees of all material information concern-
ing the take-over offer, or that the take-over offer is inequita-
ble or would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon the 
offerees .... " !d., at § 137.57.E. 
On January 19, 1979, MITE initiated a cash tender offer for 
all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet and Machine Co., a 
publicly held Illinois corporation, by filing a Schedule 14D-1 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to 
comply with the Williams Act. 2 The Schedule 14D-1 indi-
2 The Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454, et seq., codified at 15 U. S.C. 
§§ 78m(d}-(e) and 78n(d}-(t), added new sections 13(d), 13(e) and 14(d}-(t) 
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 14(d)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act requires an offeror seeking to acquire more than five per-
cent of any class of equity security by means of a tender offer to first file a 
Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The 
Schedule requires disclosure of the source of funds used to purchase the 
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cated that MITE was willing to pay $28.00 per share for any 
and all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet, a premium of ap-
proximately $4.00 over the then-prevailing market price. 
MITE did not comply with the Illinois Act, however, and 
commenced this litigation on the same day by filing an action 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois. The complaint asked for a declaratory judgment 
that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and 
violated the Commerce Clause. In addition, MITE sought a 
temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent 
injunctions prohibiting the Illinois Secretary of State from 
enforcing the Illinois Act. 
Chicago Rivet responded three days later by bringing suit 
in Pennsylvania, where it conducted most of its business, 
seeking to enjoin MITE from proceeding with its proposed 
tender offer on the ground that the offer violated the Penn-
sylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, 70 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 71 et 
seq. (Supp. 1978). After MITE's efforts to obtain relief in 
Pennsylvania proved unsuccessful, 3 both Chicago Rivet and 
target shares, past transactions with the target company, and other mate-
rial financial information about the offeror. In addition, the offeror must 
disclose any antitrust or other legal problems which might result from the 
success of the offer. 17 CFR § 240.14d-100 (1981). Section 14(d)(1) re-
quires the offeror to publish or send a statement of the relevant facts con-
tained in the Schedule 14D-1 to the shareholders of the target company. 
In addition, § 13(d), also added by the Williams Act, requires a purchaser 
of any equity security registered pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U. S. C. § 781, to file a schedule 13D with the Commission 
within ten days after its purchases have exceeded five percent of the out-
standing shares of the security. Schedule 13D requires essentially the 
same disclosures as required by Schedule 14D-1. Compare 17 CFR 
§ 240.13d-101 (1981) with 17 CFR § 240.14d-100 (1981). 
8 In addition to filing suit in state court, Chicago Rivet filed a complaint 
with the Pennsylvania Securities Commission requesting the Commission 
to enforce the Pennsylvania Act against MITE. On January 31, 1979 the 
Pennsylvania Securities Commission decided that it would not invoke the 
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. The next day, the United States 
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the Illinois Secretary of State took steps to invoke the Illinois 
Act. On February 1, 1979, the Secretary of State notified 
MITE that he intended to issue an order requiring it to cease 
and desist further efforts to make a tender offer for Chicago 
Rivet. On February 2, 1979 Chicago Rivet notified MITE 
by letter that it would file suit in Illinois state court to enjoin 
the proposed tender offer. MITE renewed its request for 
injunctive relief in the District Court and on February 2 the 
District Court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the 
Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois Act against 
MITE's tender offer for Chicago Rivet. 
MITE then published its tender offer in the February 5 
edition of the Wall Street Journal. The offer was made to all 
shareholders of Chicago Rivet residing throughout the 
United States. The outstanding stock was worth over $23 
million at the offering price. On the same day Chicago Rivet 
made an offer for approximately 40% of its own shares at 
$30.00 per share. 4 The District Court entered final judg-
ment on February 9, declaring that the Illinois Act was pre-
empted by the Williams Act and that it violated the Com-
merce Clause. Accordingly, the District Court permanently 
enjoined enforcement of the Illinois statute against MITE. 
Shortly after final judgment was entered, MITE and Chicago 
Rivet entered into an agreement whereby both tender offers 
were withdrawn and MITE was given 30 days to examine the 
books and records of Chicago Rivet. Under the agreement 
MITE was either to make a tender offer of $31.00 per share 
before March 12, 1979, which Chicago Rivet agreed not to op-
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to which MITE 
had removed the state court action, denied Chicago Rivet's motion for a 
temporary restraining order. 
• Chicago Rivet's offer for its own shares was exempt from the require-
ments of the Illinois Act pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, 
§ 137.52-9.(4) (Supp. 1980). 
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pose, or decide not to acquire Chicago Rivet's shares or as-
sets. App. to Brief for Appellees 1a-4a. On March 2, 1979, 
MITE announced its decision not to make a tender offer. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed sub nom. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F. 2d 486 
(1980). It agreed with the District Court that several provi-
sions of the Illinois Act are preempted by the Williams Act 
and that the Illinois Act unduly burdens interstate commerce 
in violation of the Commerce Clause. We noted probable ju-
risdiction, 451 U. S. 968 (1981), and now affirm. 
II 
The Court of Appeals specifically found that this case was 
not moot, 633 F. 2d, at 490, reasoning that because the Secre-
tary has indicated he intends to enforce the Act against 
MITE, a reversal of the judgment of the District Court would 
expose MITE to civil and criminal liability 5 for making the 
February 5, 1979 offer in violation of the Illinois Act. We 
agree. It is urged that the preliminary injunction issued by 
the District Court is a complete defense to civil or criminal 
penalties. While, as JUSTICE STEVENS' concurrence indi-
cates, that is not a frivolous question by any means, it is an 
issue to be decided when and if the Secretary of State initi-
ates an action. That action would be foreclosed if we agree 
with the Court of Appeals that the Illinois Act is unconstitu-
tional. Accordingly, the case is not moot. 
III 
We first address the holding that the Illinois Takeover Act 
is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. We note at 
5 The Secretary of State may bring an action for civil penalties for viola-
tions of the Illinois Act., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1211/2, § 137.65 (Supp. 1980), 
and a person who willfully violates the Act is subject to criminal prosecu-
tion. I d., at § 137.63. 
------·- ---- - - -- - -·· ·- --- -·-"- -----
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the outset that in passing the Williams Act, which is an 
amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Con-
gress did not also amend § 28(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78bb(a). 6 In pertinent part, § 28(a) provides as follows: 
"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of 
the securities commission (or any agency or officer per-
forming like functions) of any state over any security or 
any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provi-
sions of this chapter or the rules and regulations 
thereunder." 
Thus Congress did not explicitly prohibit states from regulat-
ing takeovers; it left the determination whether the Illinois 
statute conflicts with the Williams Act to the courts. Of 
course, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually 
conflicts with a valid federal statute; and, 
"[a] conflict will be found 'where compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility 
.. . ,'Florida Lime & A vocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 
373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963), or where the state 'law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941); Jones v. 
Rath Packing Co., supra, at 526, 54(}...541. Accord, De 
Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 363 (1976)." Ray v. At-
lantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 158 (1978). 
Our inquiry is further narrowed in this case since there is no 
contention that it would be impossible to comply with both 
6 There is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress was 
aware of state takeover laws when it enacted the Williams Act. When the 
Williams Act was enacted in 1968, only Virginia had a takeover statute. 
The Virginia statute, Va. Code§ 131-528, became effective March 5, 1968; 
the Williams Act was enacted several months later on July 19, 1968. 
Takeover statutes are now in effect in 37 states. Sargent, On the Validity 
of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell , 42 
Ohio St. L. J. 689, 690 n. 7 (1981). 
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the provisions of the Williams Act and the more burdensome 
requirements of the Illinois law. The issue thus is, as it was 
in the Court of Appeals, whether the Illinois Act frustrates 
the objectives of the Williams Act in some substantial way. 
The Williams Act, passed in 1968, was the congressional 
response to the increased use of cash tender offers in corpo-
rate acquisitions, a device that had "removed a substantial 
number of corporate control contests from the reach of 
exsiting disclosure requirements of the federal securities 
laws." Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U. S. 1, 22 
(1977). The Williams Act filled this regulatory gap. The 
Act imposes several requirements. First, it requires that 
upon the commencement of the tender offer, the offeror file 
with the SEC, publish or send to the shareholders of the tar-
get company, and furnish to the target company detailed in-
formation about the offer. 15 U. S.C. §78(n)(d)(1), 17 CFR 
§ 240.24d-3 (1981). The offeror must disclose information 
about its background and identity; the source of the funds to 
be used in making the purchase; the purpose of the purchase, 
including any plans to liquidate the company or make major 
changes in its corporate structure; and the extent of the 
offeror's holdings in the target company. 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78m(d)(l), 17 CFR § 240.13d-1 (1981). See also note 2, 
supra. Second, stockholders who tender their shares may 
withdraw them during the first seven days of a tender offer 
and if the offeror has not yet purchased their shares, at any 
time after sixty days from the commencement of the offer. 
15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5). 7 Third, all shares tendered must be 
purchased for the same price; if an offering price is increased, 
those who have already tendered receive the benefit of the 
increase. 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(7). 8 
7 The seven-day withdrawal period contained in the Williams Act has 
been extended to 15 business days by the Commission. 17 CFR 
§ 240.14d-7(a)(1) (1981). 
8 The Williams Act also provides that when the number of shares ten-
dered exceeds the number of shares sought in the offer, those shares ten-
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There is no question that in imposing these requirements, 
Congress intended to protect investors. Piper v. Chris-
Craft Industries, supra, at 35; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper 
Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 58 (1975); S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. 3-4 (1967) ("Senate Report"). But it is also crystal 
clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor 
was to avoid favoring either management or the takeover 
bidder. As we noted in Piper, the disclosure provisions 
originally embodied in S.2731 "were avowedly pro-manage-
ment in the target company's efforts to defeat takeover 
bids." 430 U. S., at 30. But Congress became convinced 
"that takeover bids should not be discouraged because they 
serve a useful purpose in providing a check on entrenched but 
inefficient management." Senate Report at 3. 9 It also be-
came apparent that entrenched management was often suc-
cessful in defeating takeover attempts. As the legislation 
evolved, therefore, Congress disclaimed any "intention to 
provide a weapon for management to discourage takeover 
bids ... " Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58, 
and expressly embraced a policy of neutrality. As Senator 
Williams explained, "We have taken extreme care to avoid 
tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of 
the persons making the takeover bids." 113 Cong. Rec. 
24664 (1967). This policy of "evenhandedness," Piper v. 
Chris-Craft Industries, supra, at 31, represented a convic-
tion that neither side in the contest should be extended addi-
dered during the first 10 days of the offer must be purchased on a pro rata 
basis. 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(6). The Act also contains a general antifraud 
provision, 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e), which has been interpreted to require dis-
closure of material information known to the offeror even if disclosure were 
not otherwise required. See, e. g. Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Welling-
ton Associates, 483 F. 2d 247, 250 (CA 2 1973). 
9 Congress also did not want to deny shareholders "the opportunities 
which result from the competitive bidding for a block of stock of a given 
company," namely the opportunity to sell shares for a premium over their 
market price. 113 Cong. Rec. 24666 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits). 
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tional advantages vis-a-vis the investor, who if furnished 
with adequate information would be in a position to make his 
own informed choice. We, therefore, agree with the Court 
of Appeals that Congress sought to protect the investor not 
only by furnishing him with the necessary information but 
also by withholding from management or the bidder any un-
due advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an in-
formed choice. 633 F. 2d, at 496. 
To implement this policy of investor protection while main-
taining the balance between management and the bidder, 
Congress required the latter to file with the Commission and 
furnish the company and the investor with all information ad-
equate to the occasion. With that filing, the offer could go 
forward, stock could be tendered and purchased, but a stock-
holder was free within a specified time to withdraw his ten-
dered shares. He was also protected if the offer was in-
creased. Looking at this history as a whole, it appears to us, 
as it did to the Court of Appeals, that Congress intended to 
strike a balance between the investor, management and the 
takeover bidder. The bidder was to furnish the investor and 
the target company with adequate information but there was 
no "intention to do ... more than give incumbent manage-
ment an opportunity to express and explain its position." 
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58. Once that 
opportunity was extended, Congress anticipated that the in-
vestor, if he so chose, and the takeover bidder should be free 
to move forward within the time-frame provided by 
Congress. 
IV 
The Court of Appeals identified three provisions of the Illi-
nois Act that upset the careful balance struck by Congress 
and which therefore stand as obstacles to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals in all essential respects. 
A 
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The Illinois Act requires a tender offeror to notify the Sec-
retary of State and the target company of its intent to make a 
tender offer and the material terms of the offer twenty busi-
ness days before the offer becomes effective. Ill. Rev. Stat., 
ch. 121112, §§ 137.54.E, 137.54.B (Supp. 1980.) During that 
time, the offeror may not communicate its offer to the share-
holders. Id., at § 137.54.A. Meanwhile, the target com-
pany is free to disseminate information to its shareholders 
concerning the impending offer. The contrast with the Wil-
liams Act is apparent. Under that Act, there is no pre-com-
mencement notification requirement; the critical date is the 
date a tender offer is "first published or sent or given to secu-
rity holders." 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(l). See also 17 CFR 
§ 240.14d-2 (1981). 
We agree with with the Court of Appeals that by providing 
the target company with additional time within which to take 
steps to combat the offer, the precommencement notification 
provisions furnish incumbent management with a powerful 
tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the 
stockholders who will not have an offer before them during 
this period. 10 These consequences are precisely what Con-
gress determined should be avoided, and for this reason, the 
precommencement notification provision frustrates the objec-
tives of the Williams Act. 
It is important to note in this respect that in the course of 
events leading to the adoption of the Williams Act, Congress 
several times refused to impose a precommencement disclo-
sure requirement. In October 1965, Senator Williams intro-
duced S.2731, a bill which would have required a bidder to 
notify the target company and file a public statement with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission at least 20 days be-
fore commencement of a cash tender offer for more than five 
per cent of a class of the target company's securities. 111 
Cong. Rec. 28259 (1965). The Commission commented on 
10 See note 11 and accompanying text, infra. 
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the bill and stated that "the requirement of a 20-day advance 
notice to the issuer and the Commission is unnecessary for 
the protection of security holders ... " 112 Cong. Rec. 
19005 (1966). Senator Williams introduced a new bill in 
1967, S.510, which provided for a confidential filing by the 
tender offeror with the Commission five days prior to the 
commencement of the offer. S.510 was enacted as the Wil-
liams Act after elimination of the advance disclosure require-
ment. As the Senate Report explained, 
"At the hearings it was urged that this prior review was 
not necessary and in some cases might delay the offer 
when time was of the essence. In view of the authority 
and responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to take appropriate action in the event that inad-
equate or misleading information is disseminated to the 
public to solicit acceptance of a tender offer, the bill as 
approved by the committee requires only that the state-
ment be on file with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission at the time the tender offer is first made to the 
public." Senate Report at 4. 
Congress rejected another pre-commencement notification 
proposal during deliberations on the 1970 amendments to the 
Williams Act. 11 
11 H. R. 4285, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The bill was not reported out 
of the subcommittee. Instead, the Senate amendments to the Williams 
Act, which did not contain pre-commencement notification provisions, 
were adopted. Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated detailed 
rules governing the conduct of tender offers. Rule 14d-2(b), 17 CFR 
§ 240.14d-2(b) (1981), requires that a tender offeror make its offer effective 
within five days of publicly announcing the material terms of the offer by 
disseminating specified information to shareholders and filing the requisite 
documents with the Commission. Otherwise the offeror must announce 
that it is withdrawing its offer. The events in this litigation took place 
prior to the effective date of Rule 14d-2(b), and because Rule 14d-2(b) op-
erates prospectively only, see 44 Fed. Reg. 70326 (1979), it is not at issue 
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B 
For similar reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeals 
that the hearing provisions of the Illinois Act frustrate the 
congressional purpose by introducing extended delay into the 
tender offer process. The Illinois Act allows the Secretary 
of State to call a hearing with respect to any tender offer sub-
ject to the Act, and the offer may not proceed until the hear-
ing is completed. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, §§ 137.57.A 
and B (Supp. 1980) The Secretary may call a hearing at any 
time prior to the commencement of the offer, and there is no 
deadline for the completion of the hearing. Id., at 
§§ 137.57.C and D. Although the Secretary is to render a 
decision within 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing, 
that period may be extended without limitation. Not only 
does the Secretary of State have the power to delay a tender 
offer indefinitely, but incumbent management may also use 
the hearing provisions of the Illinois Act to delay a tender of-
fer. The Secretary is required to call a hearing if requested 
to do so by, among other persons, those who are located in 
Illinois "as determined by post office address as shown on the 
records of the target company and who hold of record or ben-
eficially, or both, at least 10% of the outstanding shares of 
any class of equity securities which is the subject of the take-
over offer." Id., at § 137.57.A. Since incumbent manage-
ment in many cases will control, either directly or indirectly, 
10% of the target company's shares, this provision allows 
management to delay the commencement of an offer by in-
sisting on a hearing. As the Court of Appeals observed, 
these provisions potentially afford management a "powerful 
weapon to stymie indefinitely a takeover." 633 F. 2d, at 
494. 12 In enacting the Williams Act, Congress itself "recog-
in this case. 
12 Delay has been characterized as "the most potent weapon in a tender 
offer fight. " Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Ef-
fects , and Political Competency, 62 Cornell L. Rev. 213, 238 (1977). See 
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nized that delay can seriously impede a tender offer" and 
sought to avoid it. Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 
577 F. 2d 1256, 1277 (CA5 1978); Senate Report at 4. 13 
Congress reemphasized the consequences of delay when it 
enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 
Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 15 U. S. C. 12, et seq. 
"[I]t is clear that this short waiting period [the ten-day 
period for proration provided for by § 14(d)(6) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act, which applies only after a tender 
offer is commenced] was founded on congressional con-
cern that a longer delay might unduly favor the target 
firm's incumbent management, and permit them to frus-
trate many pro-competitive cash tenders. This ten-day 
waiting period thus underscores the basic purpose of the 
Williams Act-to maintain a neutral policy towards cash 
tender offers, by avoiding lengthy delays that might dis-
courage their chances for success." H. R. Rep. No. 
94-1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976). 14 
also Wachtel!, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. L. 1433, 
1437-1442 (1977); Wilner and Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover 
Laws and Their Constitutionality, 45 Ford. L. Rev. 1, !f.-10 (1976). 
13 According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, delay enables 
a target company to: 
"(1) repurchase its own securities; 
"(2) announce dividend increases or stock splits; 
"(3) issue additional shares of stock; 
"(4) acquire other companies to produce an antitrust violation should the 
tender offer succeed; 
"(5) arrange a defensive merger; 
"(6) enter into restrictive loan agreements, 
"(7) institute litigation challenging the tender offer." Brief for the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae 10, n. 8. 
" Representative Rodino set out the consequences of delay in greater 
detail when he described the relationship between the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Act and the Williams Act: 
"In the case of cash tender offers, more so than in other mergers, the equi-
ties include time and the danger of undue delay. This bill in no way in-
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As we have said, Congress anticipated investors and the 
takeover offeror be free to go forward without unreasonable 
delay. The potential for delay provided by the hearing pro-
visions upset the balance struck by Congress by favoring 
management at the expense of stockholders. We therefore 
agree with the Court of Appeals that these hearing provi-
sions conflict with the Williams Act. 
c 
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Illinois Act is 
pre-empted by the Williams Act insofar as it allows the Sec-
retary of State of Illinois to pass on the substantive fairness 
of a tender offer. Under § 137.57.E of the Illinois law, the 
Secretary is required to deny registration of a takeover offer 
if he finds that the offer "fails to provide full and fair disclo-
sure to the offerees . . . or that the take-over offer is inequita-
ble . . . . " (Emphasis added). 15 The Court of Appeals un-
derstood the Williams Act and its legislative history to 
tends to repeal or reverse the congresional purpose underlying the 1968 
Williams Act, or the 1970 amendments to that act. . . . Lengthier delays 
will give the target firm plenty of time to defeat the offer, .by abolishing 
cumulative voting, arranging a speedy defense merger, quickly incorporat-
ing in a State with an antitakeover statute, or negotiating costly lifetime 
employment contracts for incumbent management. And the longer the 
waiting period, the more the target's stock may be bid up in the market, 
making the offer more costly-and less successful. Should this happen, it 
will mean that shareholders of the target firm will be effectively deprived 
of the choice that cash tenders give to them: Either accept the offer and 
thereby gain the tendered premium, or reject the offer. Generally, the 
courts have construed the Williams Act so as to maintain these two options 
for the target company's shareholders, and the House Conferees contem-
plate that the courts will continue to do so." 122 Cong. Rec. 30877 (1976). 
'
5 Appellant argues that the Illinois Act does not permit him to ajudicate 
the substantive fairness of a tender offer. Brief for Appellant 21-22. On 
this state-law issue, however, we follow the view of the Court of Appeals 
that§ 137.57.E allows the Secretary of State "to pass upon the substantive 
fairness of a tender offer . . . . " 633 F. 2d, at 493. 
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indicate that Congress intended for investors to be free to 
make their own decisions. We agree. Both the House and 
Senate Reports observed that the Act was "designed to make 
the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair 
opportunity to make their decision." H. R. Rep. No. 1711, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968); Senate Report at 3. Thus, as 
the Court of Appeals said, "[t]he state thus offers investor 
protection at the expense of investor autonomy-an approach 
quite in conflict with that adopted by Congress." 633 F. 2d, 
at 494. 
v 
The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have 
Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several 
states." U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "[A]t least since 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852), it has been 
clear that 'the Commerce Clause. . . . even without imple-
menting legislation by Congress is a limitation upon the 
power of the States."' Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366, 370-371 (1976), quoting Freeman v. 
Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). See also Lewis v. BT In-
vestment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 35 (1980). Not 
every exercise of state power with some impact on interstate 
commerce is invalid. A state statute must be upheld if it 
"regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local pub-
lic interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental ... unless the burden imposed on such commerce 
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970), citing 
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 443 (1960). 
The Commerce Clause, however, permits only incidental 
regulation of interstate commerce by the states; direct regu-
lation is prohibited. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 
U. S. 189, 199 (1925). See also Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 
supra, at 142. The Illinois Act violates these principles for 
two reasons. First, it directly regulates and prevents, un-
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less its terms are satisfied, interstate tender offers which in 
turn would generate interstate transactions. Second, the 
burden the Act imposes on interstate commerce is excessive 
in light of the local interests the Act purports to further. 
A 
States have traditionally regulated intrastate securities 
transactions, 16 and this Court has upheld the authority of 
states to enact "blue-sky" laws against Commerce Clause 
challenges on several occasions. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 
242 U. S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards 
Co., 242 U. S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 
242 U. S. 568 (1917). The Court's rationale for upholding 
blue-sky laws was that they only regulated transactions oc-
curring within the regulating states. "The provisions of the 
law . . . apply to dispositions of securities within the State 
and while information of those issued in other States and for-
eign countries is required to be filed . . . they are only af-
fected by the requirement of a license of one who deals with 
them within the State. . . . Such regulations affect inter-
state commerce in securities only incidentally." Hall v. Gei-
ger-Jones Co., supra, at 557-558 (cites omitted). Congress 
has also recognized the validity of such laws governing intra-
state securities transactions in § 28a of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(a), a provision "designed to 
save state blue-sky laws from preemption." Leroy v. Great 
Western United Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 182, n. 13 (1979). 
The Illinois Act differs substantially from state blue-sky 
laws in that it directly regulates transactions which take 
place across state lines, even if wholly outside the State of 
Illinois. A tender offer for securities of a publicly-held cor-
poration is ordinarily communicated by the use of the mails or 
16 For example, the Illinois Blue Sky law, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2, 
§ 137.1, et seq. (Supp. 1980), provides that securities subject to the law 
must be registered "prior to sale in this State . ... " I d., at § 137.5. 
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other means of interstate commerce to shareholders across 
the country and abroad. Securities are tendered and trans-
actions closed by similar means. Thus, in this case, MITE 
Corporation, the tender offeror, is a Delaware corporation 
with principal offices in Connecticut. Chicago Rivet is a 
publicly-held Illinois corporation with shareholders scattered 
around the country, 27% of whom live in Illinois. Mite's 
offer to Chicago Rivet's shareholders, including those in Illi-
nois, necessarily employed interstate facilities in communi-
cating its offer, which, if accepted, would result in transac-
tions occurring across state lines. These transactions would 
themselves be interstate commerce. Yet the Illinois law, 
unless complied with, sought to prevent Mite from making its 
offer and concluding interstate transactions not only with 
Chicago Rivet's stockholders living in Illinois, but also with 
those living in other states and having no connection with Illi-
nois. Indeed, the Illinois law on its face would apply even if 
not a single one of Chicago Rivet's shareholders were a resi-
dent of Illinois, since the Act applies to every tender offer for 
a corporation meeting two of the following conditions: the 
corporation has its principal executive office in Illinois, is or-
ganized under Illinois laws, or has at least 10% of its stated 
capital and paid-in surplus represented in Illinois. Ill. Rev. 
Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.52-10.(2) (Supp. 1980). Thus the Act 
could be applied to regulate a tender offer which would not 
affect a single Illinois shareholder. 
It is therefore apparent that the Illinois statute is a direct 
restraint on interstate commerce and that it has a sweeping 
extraterritorial effect. Furthermore, if Illinois may impose 
such regulations, so may other states; and interstate com-
merce in securities transactions generated by tender offers 
would be thoroughly stifled. In Shafer v. Farmers Grain 
Co., 268 U. S., at 199, the Court held that "a state statute 
which by its necessary operation directly interferes with or 
burdens ... [interstate] commerce is a prohibited regulation 
and invalid, regardless of the purpose with which it was en-
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acted." See also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 
U. S. 794, 806 (1976). The Commerce Clause also precludes 
the application of a state statute to commerce that takes 
place wholly outside of the state's borders, whether or not 
the commerce has effects within the state. In Southern Pa-
cific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 775 (1945), the Court 
struck down on Commerce Clause grounds a state law where 
the "practical effect of such regulation is to control ... [con-
duct] beyond the boundaries of the state .... " The limits on 
a state's power to enact substantive legislation are similar to 
the limits on the jurisdiction of state courts. In either case, 
"any attempt 'directly' to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over persons or property would offend sister States and ex-
ceed the inherent limits of the State's power." Shafer v. 
Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 197 (1977). 
Because the Illinois Act purports to regulate directly and 
to interdict interstate commerce, including commerce wholly 
outside the state, it must be held invalid as were the laws at 
issue in Shafer and Southern Pacific. 
B 
The Illinois Act is also unconstitutional under the test of 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S., at 142, for even when 
a state statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the 
burden imposed on that commerce must not be excessive in 
relation to the local interests served by the statute. The 
most obvious burden the Illinois Act imposes on interstate 
commerce arises from the statute's previously-described na-
tionwide reach which purports to give Illinois the power to 
determine whether a tender offer may proceed anywhere. 
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to 
block a nationwide tender offer are substantial. Sharehold-
ers are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a 
premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their 
highest-valued use, a process which can improve efficiency 
and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer 
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mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well 
so that stock prices remain high is reduced. See 
Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 
1161, 1173-1174 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market 
Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regula-
tion of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 
(1978); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 
(1976). 
Appellant claims the Illinois Act furthers two legitimate 
local interests. He argues that Illinois seeks to protect resi-
dent security holders and that the Act merely regulates the 
internal affairs of companies incorporated under Illinois law. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that these asserted in-
terests are insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois im-
poses on interstate commerce. 
While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state 
objective, the state has no legitimate interest in protecting 
non-resident shareholders. Insofar as the Illinois law bur-
dens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed 
in the balance to sustain the law. We note, furthermore, 
that the Act completely exempts from coverage a corpora-
tion's acquisition of its own shares. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 
112, § 137.52.09.4. Thus Chicago Rivet was able to make a 
competing tender offer for its own stock without complying 
with the Illinois Act, leaving Chicago Rivet's shareholders to 
depend only on the protections afforded them by federal se-
curities law, protections which Illinois views as inadequate to 
protect investors in other contexts. This distinction is at 
variance with Illinois' asserted legislative purpose, and tends 
to undermine appellant's justification for the burdens the 
statute imposes on interstate commerce. 
We are also unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially 
enhances the shareholders' position. The Illinois Act seeks 
to protect shareholders of a company subject to a tender offer 
by requiring disclosures regarding the offer, assuring that 
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shareholders have adequate time to decide whether to tender 
their shares, and according shareholders withdrawal, prora-
tion and equal consideration rights. However, the Williams 
Act provides these same substantive protections, compare 
Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, §§ 137.59.C, D, and E (Supp. 
1980) (withdrawal, proration, and equal consideration rights) 
with 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5), (6) and (7) and 17 CFR 
§240.14d-7 (1981) (same). As the Court of Appeals noted, 
the disclosures required by the Illinois Act which go beyond 
those mandated by the Williams Act and the regulations pur-
suant to it may not substantially enhance the shareholders' 
ability to make informed decisions. 633 F. 2d, at 500. It 
also was of the view that the possible benefits of the potential 
delays required by the Act may be outweighed by the in-
creased risk that the tender offer will fail due to defensive 
tactics employed by incumbent management. We are unpre-
pared to disagree with the Court of Appeals in these re-
spects, and conclude that the protections the Illinois Act af-
fords resident security holders are, for the most part, 
speculative. 
Appellant also contends that Illinois has an interest in 
regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated 
under its laws. The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of 
laws principle which recognizes that only one state should 
have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal af-
fairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or be-
tween the corporation and its current officers, directors, and 
shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be 
faced with conflicting demands. See Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws, § 302, Comment b at 307-308 (1971). 
That doctrine is of little use to the state in this context. 
Tender offers contemplate transfers of stock by stockholders 
to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal 
affairs of the target company. Great Western United Corp. 
v. Kidwell, 577 F. 2d, at 1280, n. 53; Restatement, supra, 
§ 302, comment e at 310. Furthermore, the proposed justifi-
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cation is somewhat incredible since the Illinois Act applies to 
tender offers for any corporation for which 10% of the out-
standing shares are held by Illinois residents, Ill. Rev. Stat., 
ch. 121 112, § 137.52--10 (Supp. 1980). The Act thus applies 
to corporations that are not incorporated in Illinois and have 
their principal place of business in other states. Illinois has 
no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign 
corporations. 
We conclude with the Court of Appeals that the Illinois Act 
imposes a substantial on interstate commerce which out-
weighs its putative local benefits. It is accordingly invalid 
under the Commerce Clause. 
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Justice Powell, concurring in part. 
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jsw 06/16/82 
Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: Edgar v. Mite 
The voting on this case breaks down as follows: 
BRW: Preemption -- CJ; HAB {tentative) 
Commerce Clause --CJ; JPS; SOC 
TM: WJB 
WHR: No one else. 
As a result, no one theory currently commands a Court. BRW 
does, however, have 5 votes for a judgment. 
In this situation, I have three recommendations. 
1. The recommendation that I urge the most strongly is 
that you stick by TM and his mootness vote. I have made this case 
before and will not bore you at length now. But I think that once 
you agree that the Court is without jurisdiction, this should end 
analysis for you. Further comment seems to me to be dicta. It 
seems especially anomalous that such "dicta" should cast the decid-
ing vote for a particular theory that then becomes binding precedent 
until overruled. 
2. If you disagree, my next recommendation is that you 
select the narrowest of the many available alternative theories to 
resolve the merits of this case. Unquestionably the narrowest of 
BRW's theories is his preemption analysis {Parts III and IV). This 
2. 
analysis applies only to tender offer laws, and could have no possi-, . 
ble application to state blue sky statutes. In addition, I agree 
with the numerous commentators on this point that Congress sought to 
preserve a neutrality with which state takeover laws -- although 
completely well intentioned and perhaps of superior wisdom -- do 
undoubtedly interfere. This interference is plain from the frequen-
cy with which target companies attempt resort to state statute pro-
tection. 
This holding by the Court would not extend outside the 
tender offer area and would leave the problem for Congress if it 
believes that the Court has erred. Your vote would leave this case 
with only pluralities for each of theories on the merits. But you 
may view this a something of an advantage if you are reluctant to 
make binding law in a case that you believe is moot. 
3. If you disagree again, I recommend that you join BRW's 
Part VB. This portion of his Commerce Clause analysis is narrower 
that Part VA. Both A and B possibly could be read as threatening 
state blue sky laws, which do have some extraterritorial effect in 
halting stock sales that are not completely intrastate. Part B, 
however, is narrower than Part A in that it is tied more directly to 
the characteristics and justifications for the particular Illinois 
statute here under attack. 
The Commerce Clause holding again would leave the matter 
susceptible to ultimate congressional review. But the holding would 
be broader than the preemption analysis because of the relevance of 
the holding to state laws outside of the tender offer context --
notably state blue sky statutes. 
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June 1 6, 19 8 2 
No. 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear Byron, 
After revising my own views about this 
case more than once, I have decided to join Parts I, 
II and V of your opinion. 
I will circulate a paragraph so stating. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
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Re: No. 80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear Byron: 
June 17, 1982 
Just for the record, I formally join Parts I, II, III, 
and IV of your opinion. 
According to my notes, you have a Court for Parts I, 
II, and V-B, four votes for Part V-A and three votes for 
Parts III and IV. 
Sincerely, 
Justice White 
cc: The Conference 
Cl-iAMBERS OF' 
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June 18, 1982 
Memorandum to the Conference 
Re: No. 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite 
I 
I may suggest to Henry Lind that he include the following as 
part of the syllabus in Edgar v. Mite--for the benefit of 
confused readers. What do you think? 
The votes for Justice White's opinion are as follows: 
Parts 
I II III IVA !VB IVC VA VB 
X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X X X 
X X X X X X 
X X X 
X X X 
X X X X 
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There are five votes for parts I ·(statement of the case) , II 
(mootness) , and VB (invalid under commerce clause) . 
There are six separate opinions. 
1) Justice White 
2) Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissenting on 
mootness grounds. 
3) Justice Rehnquist, dissentiDg on mootness grounds. 
4) Justice Powell, concurring in part. 
5) Justice Stevens, concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment. 
6) Justice O'Connor, concurring in part. 
The votes have shifted as follows: 
1) Justice Marshall circulates opinion for the Court. 
2) Justice Brennan joins. 
3) Justice Rehnquist joins. 
4) Justice Powell joins. 
5) Justice White circulates a dissent. 
6) Justice Stevens circulates a dissent. 
7) Justice Blackmun joins Justice White. 
8) Justice O'Connor joins Justice Stevens. 
9) The Chief Justice joins Justice Marshall. 
10) Justice Rehnquist changes vote. 
11) The Chief Justice changes vote. 
12) Justice White circulates opinion for the Court. 
13) Justice Marshall circulates dissent. 
14) Justice Brennan joins Justice Marshall. 
15) Justice Stevens circuates concurring opinion. 
16) Justice Rehnquist circulates dissent. 
17) The Chief Justice joins Justice White. 
18) Justice O'Connor concurs. 
19) Justice Powell concurs. 
20) Justice Blackmun concurs. 
Sincerely, 
TM 
CHAMB E R S OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~ttpt"tntt Qfllttrl llf tJrt ~tb ~ta!t.a' 
~lfinghm. ~. <!J. 20~)1.~ 
June 18, 1982 
Re: 80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corp. 
Dear Thurgood, 
You are just envious. Counting all of 
the x's set out, I bet you have never had as 
many votes for any of your opinions. I am 
proud of each of these votes, especially 
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JU S TICE JOHN PAUL S T E V E NS 
June 18, 1982 
Re: 80-1188 - Eagar v. Mite Corp. 
Dear Thurgood: 
If you can devise a three-dimensional device 
that will reflect the information on page one ana the 
information on page two simultaneously--ana if ATEX 
can print it without blowing a fuse ana thereby 
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80-1188 Edgar v. Mtte 
near ~vron: 
~hurqood's wonderful "charting" of the gyrations 
of the "Brothers and Sister" in this case should make the 
history ho0ks. 
I note that among thos~ who have "avrated", I may 
be tied for the leadershiP with John. Not wishing to be 
outdone, my final vote is to join Parts I and V-B onlv - as 
expressed in the enclosed revision of my little concurrence. 
I look forward to hearing you announce this case 
and to what the reporters say about it. 
Sincerely, 
,Just i.CP ril, i te 
J fo/sc; 
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80-1188 Edgar v. Mite 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring in part. 
I agree with Justice Marhsa11 that this case is 
moot. In view, however, of the decision of majority of the 
Court to reach the merits, I join Parts I and V-B of the 
Court's opinion. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. 
Dear Byron: 
~U:Vttntt <!Jettrl of flrt ~ttitth ~hdts 
~asfringtlttt. Ifl. <!f. 20gtJ.1~ 
June 19, 1982 
80-1188 Edgar v. Mite 
Thurgood's wonderful "charting" of the gyrations 
of the "Brothers and Sister" in this case should make the 
history books. 
I note that among those who have "gyrated", I may 
be tied for the leadership with John. Not wishing to be 
outdone, my final vote is to join Parts I and V-B only - as 
expressed in the enclosed revision of my little concurrence. 
I look forward to hearing you announce this case 
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jsw 06/19/82 10:05 AM 
Memorandum to Justice Powell 
v 
~{~ 
Re: Edgar v. Mite ~ v-l-' j..A Y 
The introduction to Part V (pp. 15-16) sta~t~ ~~-
linois Act violates the Commerce Clause for two reasons: "First, it 
directly regulates and prevents, unless its terms are satisfied, 
interstate tender offers which [sic!] in turn would generate inter-
state transaction. Second, the burden the Act imposes on interstate 
commerce is excessive in light of the local interests the Act pur-
ports to further." The two subsequent subparts elaborate these dis-
tinct and alternative rationales. 
Part VA focuses on the "direc[t]" geographic effect of the 
"----' state law. P. 16. It stresses that the Illinois Act "directly reg-
ulates transactions which rsic!] take place across state lines, even 
if wholly outside the State of Illinois." p. 16. It is this 
"sweeping extraterritorial effect" that is found to condemn the law, 
p. 17, irrespective of the State's purpose in enacting the law. 
This section argues simply that ~ such expansive regulation is 
beyond State power. 
Part VB concentrates on weighing the "indirec [t]" burdens 
of the State's regulation against "the local interests served by the 
statute." P. 18. BRW concludes this weighing by finding that the 
indirect effects are "substantial," p. 18, while Illinois' "asserted 
interests are insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois imposes 
on interstate commerce." P. 19. 
2. 
Parts VA and VB are alternative because the two arguments 
do not build on each other and each concludes that the state law is 
invalid. Part VB is narrower than part VA because VB takes into 
------., 
account the State's asserted interests in its law. A law with the 
same extraterritorial effect but with stronger justifications might 
have survived part VB. It logically could not survive part VA, how-
ever, because that section looks only to the extent of 
extraterritorrial effect. It engages in no balancing. 
Part III is just an exposition of preemption principles in 
the context of the Williams Act. It is completely irrelevant to 
resolution of the case on grounds of parts VA and VB. Your join of 
this section in effect would constitute a broad gauge expression of 
dicta. 
In sum, if you do not wish to join part II, I recommend 
that you join only parts I and VB. This completely resolves the 
case, but does so on the narrowest Commerce Clause grounds -- thus 
creating the smallest degree of risk to state blue sky laws. 
~u.pumt <!JL11trlcf tltt ~t~ ~hrlts 
~a$fringhm.1B. <!J. 20.;1'-1" 
CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
June 21, 1982 
80-1188 Edgar v. Mite 
Dear Byron: 
Here is the paragraph that I mentioned this 
morning as being something I would like to add to my little 
concurring statement. It explains - what is not self 
evident - why I join only Part V-B of the operative portion 
of your opinion. 
I should have done this much earlier, and 
therefore have said that if this addition would hold you up 
I will scrub it. I am delivering copies to the printer and 
to Henry Lind. 
This also will enable Thurgood to make an 
additional entry in his chart. 
Justice White 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 





Rider A, Mite 
I join only Part V-B because its Commerce Clause 
reasoning leaves some room for state regulation of tender 
offers. In a period in our history marked by conglomerate 
corporate formations essentially unrestricted by the 
antitrust laws, it is far from clear to me that the 
Williams Act's policy of "neutrality" operates fairly or 
in the public interest. Often the offeror possesses 
resources, in terms of professional personnel experienced 
in takeovers as well as in capital, that vastly exceed 
those of the takeover target. This disparity in resources 
may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or regional 
target corporation. The Williams Act provisions seem to 
entities of substantially equal assume corporate 
resources. Moreover, in terms of general public interest, 
when corporate headquarters are moved away from a city and 
State inevitably there are certain adverse consequences.* 
I therefore agree with Justice Stevens that the Williams 
Act should not necessarily be read as prohibiting state 
legislation designed to assure at least in some 
circumstances greater protection to interests that 
L.. 
include but often are broader than those of incumbent 
management. 
*The corporate headquarters of the great national and 
multi-national corporations tend to be located in the 
large cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters 
are transferred out of a city and State into one of these 
metropolitan centers, the State and locality from which 
the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly. 
Management personnel many of whom have provided 
community leadership may move to the new corporate 
headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and 
educational life both in terms of leadership and 
financial support - also tend to diminish when there is a 
move of corporate headquarters. 
.p+ I :6 : 
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Dear Byron: 
Here is the paragraph th~t I mentioned this 
morning as being something I would like to add to my little 
concurring statem~nt. It ex~lains - what is not self 
evident - why I ioin only Part V-R of the opera.tive portion 
of your opi.nion. 
I should have done this much earlier, and 
therefore have said that if this addition would hol<i you up 
I will scrub it. I am deliverinq copies to the printer and 
to Henry r .. ind. 
This also will enable Thurgood to make an 
additional entry in his chart. 
Justice White 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 




Rider A, Mite 
I join only Part V-B because its Commerce Clause 
reasoning leaves some room for state regulation of tender 
offers. In a period in our history marked by conglomerate 
corporate formations essentially unrestricted by the 
antitrust laws, it is far from clear to me that the 
Williams Act's policy of "neutrality" operates fairly or 
in the public interest. Often the offeror possesses 
resources, in terms of professional personnel experienced 
in takeovers as well as in capital, that vastly exceed 
those of the takeover target. This disparity in resources 
may seriously disadvantage a relatively small or regional 
target corporation. The Williams Act provisions seem to 
entities of substantially equal assume corporate 
resources. Moreover, in terms of general public interest, 
when corporate headquarters are moved away from a city and 
State inevitably there are certain adverse consequences.* 
I therefore agree with Justice Stevens that the Williams 
Act should not necessarily be read as prohibiting state 
legislation designed to assure at least in some 
circumstances greater protection to interests that 
include but often are broader than those of incumbent 
management. 
*The corporate headquarters of the great national and 
multi-national corporations tend to be located in the 
large cities of a few States. When corporate headquarters 
are transferred out of a city and State into one of these 
metropolitan centers, the State and locality from which 
the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly. 
Management personnel many of whom have provided 
community leadership may move to the new corporate 
headquarters. Contributions to cultural, charitable, and 
educational life both in terms of leadership and 
financial support - also tend to diminish when there is a 
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JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR 
~nvr.ctttt (!Jcnrt cf t4.c ~niit~ ~taft-« 
~a,«fringtt1tt, ~.(!f. 21lgt~~ 
March 1, 1982 
No. 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear John, 
Although I voted at Conference to decide this case 
on mootness, your dissent is persuasive. 
Please join me in it. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~tttyrtutt Qfourl of tqt ~ttittb .§tait.s' 
~a.s'Irhtgton, ~. Qf. 2llgi-Jl.~ 
March 1, 1982 
No. 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear John, 
Although I voted at Conference to decide this case 
on mootness, your dissent is persuasive. 
Please join me in it. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Stevens 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.:§up-umt <!)'curt crf t4t ~nittb ~tat.Hl 
~lll1lfitt¢att. ~· <!J. 2ll6i)!,~ 
March 1 , 
Re : No . 80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear Byron : 
This case has given me much difficulty . 




cc: The Conference 
I now 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.:§uvrtmt <!Jllltd a£ tqt ~nittb ;§tab%' 
Jlct.S'fthtgton,~. <!J. 21l.;l't~ 
March 1, 1982 
No. 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear Thurgood, 
Although I initially thought th' 
resolved on the grounds of rnootness !s c~se could be 
sufficient concerns that I now b 1.' Johns dissent raises 
!;r~~s~he basis of mootness and !e 1 ~~~u~~ ~~~~~~ ~~to~e~~~e 
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~ail ftitt.g:tcn. 1B. <g. 2!1,? .lt~ 
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I 
jsw 03/17/82 
Memorandum to Justice Powell 
Re: Edgar v. Mite Corp. 
Justice Rehnquist's switch of his vote in this case, com-
bined with the Chief's announcement that he is reviewing his posi-
tion, has thrown this case into the air. As I count the votes, 
presently there are four to reach the merits (two via BRW's theory 
that we should not "reach" the mootness issue, and two via JPS' s 
theory that federal courts cannot convey durable protection in the 
form of a preliminary injunction); four to dismiss and vacate as 
moot (including your vote and the Chief's shaky vote) ; and WHR' s 
vote to dismiss the appeal and leave the CA7 decision in place. The 
first thing that comes to mind is affirmance on the basis of an 
evenly divided Court. But that doctrine seems inapplicable when 
nine Justices vote. I suppose this means that the "dissenters" who 
believe the Court can reach the merits have the stronger claim on 
WHR's vote; he at least would leave the CA7 opinion standing instead 
of vacating it as moot. 
Obviously there will have to be some further discussion 
before this case issues. I still believe that TM is correct in 
finding the case moot. I do confess, however, that JPS's dissent 
has shaken my conviction a bit. His best point is that a vacated 
2. 
injunction cannot still have the force to bar Illinois' subsequent 
prosecution of Mite. I think that that inju'nction, though vacated, 
would still bar Illinois' action on Supremacy Clause grounds. The 
DC found Mite had a federal right to engage in its conduct. Mite 
could plead this a federal defense to any future prosecution by Il-
linois. 
In short, I think you 
and await future developments. 
should stay with TM for the present ~ 
. . . 
. t' .' , 
. "·-~ .. 
.... 
' 
~u.puntt <qcnrl llf t~t~~ ~taftg 
'J)iagfringhtn. ~ · <q. 20,?)!,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
March 1 7, 1982 
Re : No. 80-1188 - Edgar v . Mite Corp. 
Dear Thurgood : 
This case has been very difficult for everyone, 
beginning with the Conference discussion . In light of 
all the writing I am now going back over all the exchanges 
and the Conference itself . There were roughly four 
different positions at Conference . 
My own concluding comment was that the intervening 
developments seemed to make this case moot . Alternatively , 
I said I could probably affirm but not on the rationale 
of the Seventh Circuit . As it should , the continuing 
exchanges have ventilated the subject more fully than 
was possible at the Conference . 




Justice Marshal l 
Copies to the Conference 
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CHAMBERS OF 
~u:pumr <qo url of Up• 'JiUtit t b ~tl:ttt s 
1trasfrington, gl. <q. 2!l~Jt.;1 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIS T 
' 
, , 
March 17, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear Thurgood: 
As I let you know just a short while ago, I have become 
more and more uneasy with my position in this case as the 
debate between you, John, and Byron has escalated. With the 
increasing prominence, in each of the recirculations, which 
has been given to the i ~sue of l Lability for the imr rovident 
iss Q9 nce o,l an injunction (a que st1on whiaf I gatner t hat 
all~ree is one ot Ei r St impression} I now find myself in 
the embarrassing position of having to withdraw my previous 
partial "join" and partial concurrence in the result. 
Although the iss~e of mootness is adequately briefed by the 
parties, the factual assertions which they necessarily make 
to support their positions are, in my view, not adequately 
documented in this skimpy record. I think it is something 
akin to the tail wagging the dog to decide the injunction 
issue in order to dispose of the mootness question: the 
latter simply consists of the application of well recognized 
principles to this particular case, while the former is an 
important and novel issue. 
Would you, therefore, please note at the end of your 
opinion the following: 
"JUSTICE REHNQUIST, believing that it is 
impossible to dispose of the issue of mootness in 
this case without deciding far-reaching questions 
of first impression tendered on a record all but 
barren of the factual development necessary to 
their decision, would dismiss the appeal. See 




(1972); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 
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March 17, 1982 
80-1188 l'.!dgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear Thurgood: 
I am st i 1J with you. 
Justice Marshall 
lfp/ss 
cc: ~he Conference 
Sincerely, 
.§uprttnt <qourt rrf Hrt ~t.cb ~._ts 
'J!l'f as fringwn, IB . <g. 2ll.? '* 2 
CHAMB E RS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
" ( I 
April 8, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corp. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
My memo of March 17 reflected "second thoughts" 
arising from the differing views that emerged in the 
several separate and dissenting opinions. 
I now conclude that I am in general agreement 
with Byron's latest draft. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.§u.p-rnnt Qfonrl of tlrt ~q .§taft5 
~rurlyi:ng-Ltn,llJ. <!f. 211,?~~ · · 
April 21, 1982 
Re : 80-1188 - Edgar v. l1ite Corp. 
Dear Byron: 
In view of the exchanges, it appears the case should 
be assigned to you . 
Regards , 
Justice White 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
~tt:pr ttttt ~!lllrt d tft t ~nib~ ~tab$' 
~curftington,lliJ. ~· 2.0.;;:'1-~ 
April 23, 1982 
Re: 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corporation 
Dear Byron, 
In reviewing my notes on this case it appears that I 
thought the extraterritorial aspects of the Illinois statute 
interfere impermissibly with interstate commerce. I 
also thought the Williams Act did not preempt the state law 
because Congress had not expressed such an intent. I am 
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CHAMBE R S OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iupuutt Clftturl!tf tltt ~t~ j\bdts 
Jras!pngbm. ~. <4~ 2ll.?'!~ 
May 3, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corp. 
Dear Byron: 
You have inquired each of the last couple of Conferences 
how we all stood on this case since it has been reassigned 
to you. I did not volunteer any position, because I have 
wandered all over the lot as it is, and wanted to be fairly 
sure that if I did make some statement there would be a 
reasonable probability that I would stick to it. I have done 
a fair amount of thinking about the case, and while I still 
cannot join Thurgood's proposed disposition concluding that 
the case is moot, I think that by following a different route 
I can avoid confronting the "injunction" issue debated between 
Thurgood and John and nonetheless conclude it is moot. I 
find support for my position in Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri, 
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To: Justice Stevens 
From: David DeBruin 
Date: May 3, 1982 
Justice Rehnquist relies on Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri, 
361 U.S. 363, to conclude that Mite is moot. In Oil Workers, a 
state statute authorized the Governor to take possession of any 
public utility aff e cted by a work stoppage when in his opinion 
"the public interest, health and welfare are jeopardized." The 
statute prohibited any concerted refusal to work after the 
utility had been taken over by the State. If a union struck 
after that time, (1) the union became subject to statutory 
penalties, and (2) the strike could be enjoined by a state court. 
In Oil Workers, a union struck a gas company after an 
existing collective bargaining agr~ement expired . Five days 
later the Governor took possession of the utility . After the 
seizure, the union continued to strike . Two actions in state 
court then followed. In one action, the State sought an 
injunction against the strike . In the second, the State sought 
monetary p e nalties from the union. The injunction was granted i n 
the first case . The union then terminated its strike and 
negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement with the 
utility. The union nevertheless challenged the injunction on 
appeal , contending that the state statute under which i t was 
- 2 -
granted was unconstitutional. The Missouri Supreme Court 
recognized that the injunction had "expired by its own terms," 
b~t considered the merits of the union's challenge to the 
statute. The state court upheld the constitutionality of the 
statute and affirmed the order that enjoined the union from 
continuing its strike. 
On appeal, this Court held that the case was moot. Since 
the union had terminated its strike, the propriety of the 
injunction issued against it was no longer a live issue. The 
Court also stated that the pendency of the separate damages 
action was irrelevant. Noting that the statutory pe nalties did 
not turn on the validity of the injunction, the Court held that 
"when [the damages] claim is litigated it will be subject to 
review, but it is not for us now to anticipate its outcome." 
Oil Workers is quite different from Mite. The potential 
liability of the union in Oil Workers for the statutory penalty 
resulted entirely from the fact that it had violated the terms of 
the statute. The fact that the union had later be en specifically 
enjoined from violating the statute could not affect the union's 
statutory liability for damages. The only effect of the 
injunction was to permit the State to seek contempt penalties in 
addition to the monetary p e nalty set forth in the statute. Of 
course, if this Court had considered the merits and determined 
whether the issuance of the injunction had been proper, it also 
would have determined whether the union was liable for the 
- 3 -
statutory penalty. The Court refused to hold, however, that the 
first action was not moot simply because its resolution would 
affect an open issue in the second. 
In Mite, the party subject to the injunction did not cease 
its arguably unlawful conduct; rather, the party protected by the 
injunction did so. In Mite it is the State that was restrained 
from enforcing its statute, and the State has not abandoned its 
desire to do so. The State currently is prohibited from 
enforcing the statute by the federal court's injunction. If that 
injunction was issued properly, the State will remain permanently 
enjoined from taking the action that it wishes to take; if the 
injunction was improper, the State will be free to seek monetary 
penalties. The validity of the injunction is very much a live 
issue in this case. 
There are two possible bases on which to conclude that this 
-
case is moot: (l) the injunction granted Mite absolute immunity 
from a future enforcement action, whether or not the injunction 
was issued properly; or (2) Mite has no interest in whether or 
not the State may bring an enforcement action against it, since 
it can always defend that action by asserting its arguments that 
the statute is unconstitutional. The first argument has been 
addressed in our dissent. The second is equally insufficient; 
Mite certainly has an interest in avoiding the uncertainty and 
costs of a future enforcement proceeding, even though it 
ultimately may prevail on the merits in such a proceeding. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iuprtnu <lfourl of tltt ~tb ~taits 
-asftingbm. ~. <If. 21l.?'!~ 
May 3, 1982 
Re: No. 80-1188 Edgar v. Mite Corp. 
Dear Byron: 
You have inquired each of the last couple of Conferences 
how we all stood on this case since it has been reassigned 
to you. I did not volunteer any position, because I have 
wandered all over the lot as it is, and wanted to be fairly 
sure that if I did make some statement there would be a 
reasonable probability that I would stick to it. I have done 
a fair amount of thinking about the case, and while I still 
cannot join Thurgood's proposed disposition concluding that 
the case is moot, I think that by following a different route 
I can avoid confronting the "injunction" issue debated between 
Thurgood and John and nonetheless conclude it is moot. I 
find support for my position in Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri, 
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CHAMBE RS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.§u:pulltt <!Jcnrl cf Urr ~b .§ta±tg 
~a,a-J.ringron. 16. <!f. 2,.0~J12 
May 4, 1982 
Re: 80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corp. 
Dear Byron: 
j 
On the merits I have grave doubts about the 
validity of the Court of Appeals' pre-emption 
analysis, but I am satisfied that the Illinois 
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P.S . For the reasons set forth in the attached 
memorandum prepared by David DeBruin , Bill 
Rehnquist's citation of the Oil Workers case does not 
change my opinion that the case is not moot. 
CHAMBE RS 0 F 
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May 4, 1982 
Re: 80-1188 - Edgar v. Mite Corp. 
Dear Byron: 
On the merits I have grave doubts about the 
validity of the Court of Appeals' pre-emption 
analysis, but I am satisfied that the Illinois 
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P.S. For the reasons set forth in the attached 
memorandum prepared by David DeBruin, Bill 
Rehnquist's citation of the Oil Workers case does not 
change my opinion that the case is not moot. 
, , , , _ Justice Marshall "-' • I · V • 
~ /t W ~ ~~ p !> Jystice Blackmun 
t.A.f ustice Powell 
/~ ' ' !J ~ C2£ f> Justice Rehnquist 
,.;/ . A/? , / Justice Stevens 
~ ry ·4/~. u-<A-. JusticeO'Connor 
~ ~ ~ From: Justice White 
 Circulated: _ _ 2_B_ M_A_Y_1_98_2 __ 
Recirculated:----=------
V~tkf-{~D!F~~k-1/'~ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~) 
No. 80-1188 4. ~ 
JAMES EDGAR, APPELLANT v. MITE CORPORATION
AND MITE HOLDINGS, INC. _ ~~ _ 
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS / _ . -:36 
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT ~ .4 
[June -, 1982] .,4-~ - ~ . 
JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is whether the Illinois Business Take-
Over Act, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.51 , et seq. (Supp. 
1980), is unconstitutional under the Supremacy and Com- /J - I _ 
merce Clauses of the Federal Constitution. ~ -
I 
Appellee MITE Corporation and its wholly-owned subsid-
iary, MITE Holdings, Inc. , are corporations organized under 
the laws of Delaware with their principal executive offices in 
Connecticut. Appellant James Edgar is the Secretary of 1- -11 ~ ~ .. .. . A _ 11 
State of Illinois and is charged with the administration and ~ /~
enforcement of the Illinois Act. Under the Illinois Act any~ '~~c. 
takeover offer 1 for the shares of a corporation must be regis- . • 
tered with the Secretary of State if 10% of the class of equity ~) if- 1111/JC-
, The Illinois Act defines "take-over offer" as "the offer to acquire or the d ,/{ 4/ 1 ~ c;;_ 
acquisition of any equity security of a target company pursuant to a tender ~ ..!/'..lf!e 
offer . .. . " Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 1/2, § 137.52-9 (Supp. 1980). "A 
tender offer has been conventionally understood to be a publicly made invi-
tation addressed to all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares 
for sale at a specified price." Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender 
Offer" Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1250, 
1251 (1973). The terms "tender offer" and "takeover offer" are often used 
interchangeably. 
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securities subject to the offer are owned by shareholders re-
siding in Illinois or if any two of the following conditions are 
met: the corporation has its principal executive office in Illi-
nois, is organized under the laws of Illinois, or has at least 
10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus represented 
within the state. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, § 137.52-9 and 
10 (Supp. 1980). An offer becomes registered 20 days after a 
registration statement is filed with the Secretary unless the 
Secretary calls a hearing. ld., at §137.54(E). The Secre-
tary may call a hearing at any time during the 20-day waiting 
period to adjudicate the substantive fairness of the offer if he 
believes it is necessary to protect the shareholders of the tar-
get company, and a hearing must be held if requested by a 
majority of a target company's outside directors or by Illinois 
shareholders who own 10% of the class of securities subject to 
the offer. Id., at§ 137.57(A). If the Secretary does hold a 
hearing, he is directed by the statute to deny registration to a 
tender offer if he finds that it "fails to provide full and fair 
disclosure to the offerees of all material information concern-
ing the take-over, or that the take-over offer is inequitable or 
would work or tend to work a fraud or deceit upon the 
offerees .... " ld., at§ 137.57.E. 
On January 19, 1979, MITE initiated a cash tender offer for 
all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet and Machine Co., a 
publicly held Illinois corporation, by filing a Schedule 14D-1 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission in order to 
comply with the Williams Act. 2 The Schedule 14D-1 indi-
2 The Williams Act, 82 Stat. 454, et seq., codified at 15 U. S. C. 
§§ 78m(d)-(e) and 78n(d)-(f), added new sections 13(d), 13(e) and 14(d)-(f) 
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section 14(d)(1) of the Securities 
Exchange Act requires an offeror seeking to acquire more than five per-
cent of any class of equity security by means of a tender offer to first file a 
Schedule 14D-1 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The 
Schedule requires disclosure of the source of funds used to purchase the 
target shares, past transctions v.ith the target company, and other mate-
rial financial information about the offeror. In addition, the offeror must 
80-1188--0PINIO N 
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cated that MITE was willing to pay $28.00 per share for any 
and all outstanding shares of Chicago Rivet, a premium of ap-
proximately $4.00 over the then-prevailing market price. 
MITE did not comply with the Illinois Act, however, and 
commenced this litigation on the same day by filing an action 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois. The complaint asked for a declaratory judgment 
that the Illinois Act was preempted by the Williams Act and 
violated the Commerce Clause. In addition, MITE sought a 
temporary restraining order and preliminary and permanent 
injunctions prohibiting the Illinois Secretary of State from 
enforcing the Illinois Act. 
Chicago Rivet responded three days later by bringing suit 
in Pennsylvania, where it conducted most of its business, 
seeking to enjoin MITE from proceeding with its proposed 
tender offer on the ground that the offer violated the Penn-
sylvania Takeover Disclosure Law, 70 Pa. Stat. Ann., Title 
70, § 711.19 (Supp. 1978). After MITE's efforts to obtain re-
lief in Pennsylvania proved unsuccessful, 3 both Chicago 
disclose any antitrust or other legal problems which might result from the 
success of the offer. 17 CFR § 240.14d-100 (1981). Section 14(d)(l) re-
quires the offeror to publish or send a statement of the relevant facts con-
tained in the Schedule 14D-1 to the shareholders of the target company. 
In addition, § 13(d), also added by the Williams Act, requires a purchaser 
of any equity security registered pursuant to § 12 of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U. S. C. § 781, to file a schedule 13D with the Commission 
within ten days after its purchases have exceeded five percent of the out-
standing shares of the security. Schedule 13D requires essentially the 
same disclosures as required by Schedule 14D-l. Compare 17 CFR 
§240.13d-101 (1981) with 17 CFR §240.14d-100 (1981). 
3 In addition to filing suit in state court, Chicago Rivet filed a complaint 
·with the Pennsylvania Securities Commission requesting the Commission 
to enforce the Pennsylvania Act against MITE. On January 31, 1979 the 
Pennsylvania Securities Commission decided that it would not invoke the 
Pennsylvania Takeover Disclosure Law. The next day, the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, to which MITE 
had removed the state court action, denied Chicago Rivet's motion for a 
80-1188-0PINION 
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Rivet and the Illinois Secretary of State took steps to invoke 
the Illinois Act. On February 1, 1979, the Secretary of 
State notified MITE that he intended to issue an order re-
quiring it to cease and desist further efforts to make a tender 
offer for Chicago Rivet. On February 2, 1979 Chicago Rivet 
notified MITE by letter that it would file suit in Illinois state 
court to enjoin the proposed tender offer. MITE renewed 
its request for injunctive relief in the District Court and on 
February 2 the District Court issued a preliminary injunction 
prohibiting the Secretary of State from enforcing the Illinois 
Act against MITE's tender offer for Chicago Rivet. 
MITE then published its tender offer in the February 5 
edition of the Wall Street Journal. The offer was made to all 
shareholders of Chicago Rivet residing throughout the 
United States. The outstanding stock was worth over $23 
million at the offering price. On the same day Chicago Rivet 
made an offer for approximately 40% of its own shares at 
$30.00 per share. 4 The District Court entered final judg-
ment on February 9, declaring that the Illinois Act was pre-
empted by the Williams Act and that it violated the Com-
merce Clause. Accordingly, the District Court permanently 
enjoined enforcement of the Illinois statute against MITE. 
Shortly after final judgment was entered, MITE and Chicago 
Rivet entered into an agreement whereby both tender offers 
were withdrawn and MITE was given 30 days to examine the 
books and records of Chicago Rivet. Under the agreement 
MITE was either to make a tender offer of $31.00 per share 
before March 12, 1979, which Chicago Rivet agreed not to op-
pose, or decide not to acquire Chicago Rivet's share or as-
sets. App. to Brief for Appellees 1a-4a. On March 2, 1979, 
MITE announced its decision not to make a tender offer. 
temporary restraining order. 
'Chicago Rivet's offer for its own shares was exempt from the require-
ments of the Illinois Act pursuant to Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, 
§ 137.52-9(4) (Supp. 1980). 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed sub n01n. MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F. 2d 486 
(1980). It agreed with the District Court that several provi-
sions of the Illinois Act are preempted by the Williams Act 
and that the Illinois Act unduly burdens interstate commerce 
in violation of the Commerce Clause. We noted probable ju-
risdiction, 451 U. S. 968 (1981), and now affirm. 
II 
The Court of Appeals specifically found that this case was 
not moot, 633 F. 2d, at 490, reasoning that because the Secre-
tary has indicated he intends to enforce the Act against 
MITE, a reversal of the judgment of the District Court would 
expose MITE to civil and criminal liability 5 for making the 
February 5, 1979 offer in violation of the Illinois Act. We 
agree. It is urged that the preliminary injunction issued by 
the District Court is a complete defense to civil or criminal 
penalties. While that is not a frivolous question by any 
means, it is an issue to be decided when and if the Secretary 
of State initiates an action. That action would be foreclosed 
if we agree with the Court of Appeals that t · s Act is 
unconstitutional. Accordingly, the case · not moot. 
III 
We first address the holding that the Illinois Takeover Act 
is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. We note at 
the outset that in passing the Williams Act, which is an 
amendment to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, Con-
gress did not also amend § 28(a) of the latter Act. 6 In perti-
nent part, § 28(a) provides as follows: 
6 The Secretary of State may bring an action for civil penalties for viola-
tions of the Illinois Act., Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.65 (Supp. 1980), 
and a person who willfully violates the Act is subject to criminal prosecu-
tion. !d., at § 137.63. 
6 There is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress was 
aware of state takeover laws when it enacted the Williams Act. When the 
6 
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"Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of 
the Securities Commission (or any agency or officer per-
forming like functions) of any state over any security or 
any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provi-
sions of this chapter or the rules and regulations 
thereunder." 
Thus Congress did not explicitly prohibit states from regulat-
ing takeovers; it left the determination whether the Illinois 
statute conflicts with the Williams Act to the courts. Of 
course, a state statute is void to the extent that it actually 
conflicts with a valid federal statute; and, 
"[a] conflict will be found 'where compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility 
... ,' Flo1~da Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 
373 U. S. 132, 142--143 (1963), or where the state 'law 
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U. S. 52, 67 (1941); Jones v. 
Rath Packing Co., supra, at 526, 540-541. Accord, De 
Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351, 363 (2976)." Ray v. At-
lantic Richfield Co., 435 U. S. 151, 158 (1978). 
Our inquiry is further narrowed in this case since there is no 
contention that it would be impossible to comply with both 
the provisions of the Williams Act and the more burdensome 
requirements of the Illinois law. The issue thus is, as it was 
in the Court of Appeals, whether the Illinois Act frustrates 
the objectives of the Williams Act in some substantial way, 
The Williams Act, passed in 1968, was the congressional 
Williams Act was enacted in 1968, only Virginia had a takeover statute. 
The Virginia statute, Va. Code§ 131-52S, became effective March 5, 1968; 
the Williams Act was enacted several months later on July 19, 1968. 
Takeover statutes are now in effect in 37 states. Sargent, On the Validity 
of State Takeover Regulation: State Responses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 
Ohio St. L. J. 689, 690 n. 7 (1981). 
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response to the increased use of cash tender offers in corpo-
rate acquisitions, a device that had "removed a substantial 
number of corporate control contests from the reach of the 
exsiting disclosure requirements of the federal securities 
laws." Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U. S. 1, 22 
(1977). The Williams Act filled this regulatory gap. The 
Act imposes several requirements. First, it requires that 
upon the commencement of the tender offer, the offeror file 
·with the SEC, publish or send to the shareholders of the tar-
get company, and furnish to the target company detailed in-
formation about the offer. 15 U. S. C. § 78(n)(d)(1), 17 CFR 
§ 240.24d-3 (1981). The offeror must disclose information 
about its background and identity; the source of the funds to 
be used in making the purchase; the purpose of the purchase, 
including any plans to liquidate the company or make major 
changes in its corporate structure; and the extent of the 
offeror's holdings in the target company. 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78m(d)(l), 17 CFR § 240.13d-1 (1981). See also note 2, 
supra. Second, stockholders who tender their shares may 
withdraw them during the first seven days of a tender offer 
and if the offeror has not yet purchased their shares, at any 
time after sixty days from the commencement of the offer. 
15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5). ; Third, all shares tendered must be 
purchased for the same price; if an offering price is increased, 
those who have already tendered receive the benefit of the 
increase. 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(7). 8 
; The seven-day withdrawal period contained in the Williams Act has 
been extended to 15 business days by the Commission. 17 CFR 
§ 240.14d-7(a)(1). 
' The Williams Act also provides that when the number of shares ten-
dered exceeds the number of shares sought in the offer, those shares ten-
dered during the first 10 days of the offer must be purchased on a pro rata 
basis. 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(6). The Act also contains a general antifraud 
provision, 15 U. S. C. § 78n(e), which has been interpreted to require dis-
closure of material information known to the offeror even if disclosure was 
not otherwise required. See, e. g. Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Welling-
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There is no question that in imposing these requirements, 
Congress intended to protect investors. Piper v. Chris-
Craft Industries, supra, at 35; Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper 
Corp., 422 U. S. 49, 58 (1975); S. Rep. No. 550, 90th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2 (1967) ("Senate Report"). But it is also crystal 
clear that a major aspect of the effort to protect the investor 
was to avoid tipping the scales in favor of either management 
or the takeover bidder. As we noted in Piper, the disclosure 
provisions originally embodied in 8.2731 "were avowedly pro-
management in the target company's efforts to defeat take-
over bids." 430 U. S., at 30. But Congress became con-
vinced "that takeover bids should not be discouraged because 
they serve a useful purpose in providing a check on en-
trenched but inefficient management." Senate Report at 3. 9 
It also became apparent that entrenched management was of-
ten successful in defeating takeover attempts. As the legis-
lation evolved, therefore, Congress disclaimed any "intention 
to provide a weapon for management to discourage takeover 
bids ... " Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58, 
and expressly embraced a policy of neutrality. As Senator 
Williams explained, "We have taken extreme care to avoid 
tipping the scales either in favor of management or in favor of 
the persons making the takeover bids." 113 Cong. Rec. 
24664 (1967). This policy of "evenhandedness", Pipe1· v. 
Chris-Craft Industries, supra, at 31, represented a convic-
tion that neither side in the contest should be extended addi-
tional advantages vis-a-vis the investor, who if furnished 
with adequate information should be in a position to make his 
own informed choice. We, therefore, agree with the Court 
of Appeals that Congress sought to protect the investor not 
ton Associates, 483 F. 2d 247, 250 (CA 2 1973). 
• Congress also did not want to deny shareholders "the opportunities 
which result from the competitive bidding for a block of stock of a given 
company", namely the opportunity to sell shares for a premium over their 
market price. 113 Cong. Ref. 24665 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Javits). 
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only by furnishing him with the necessary information but 
also by withholding from management or the bidder any un-
due advantage that could frustrate the exercise of an in-
formed choice. 633 F. 2d, at 496. 
To implement this policy of investor protection while main-
taining the balance between management and the bidder, 
Congress required the latter to file with the Commission and 
furnish the company and the investor with all information ad-
equate to the occasion. With that filing, the offer could go 
forward, stock could be tendered and purchased, but a stock-
holder was free within a specified time to withdraw his ten-
dered shares. He was also protected if the offer was in-
creased. Looking at this history as a whole, it appears to us, 
as it did to the Court of Appeals, that Congress intended to 
strike a balance between the investor, management and the 
takeover bidder. The bidder was to furnish the investor and 
the target company with adequate information but there was 
no "intention to do . . . more than give incumbent manage-
ment an opportunity to express and explain its position." 
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., supra, at 58. Once that 
opportunity was extended, Congress anticipated that the in-
vestor, if he so chose, and the takeover bidder should be free 
to move forward within the time-frame provided by 
Congress. 
IV 
The Court of Appeals identified three provisions of the Illi-
nois Act that upset the careful balance struck by Congress 
and which therefore stand as obstacles to the accomplishment 
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals in all essential respects. 
A 
The Illinois Act requires tender offerors to notify the Sec-
retary of State and the target company of its intent to make a 
tender offer and the material terms of the offer twenty busi-
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ness days before the offer becomes effective. Ill. Rev. Stat., 
ch. 121 112, §§ 137.54E, 137.54B (Supp. 1980.) During that 
time, the offeror may not communicate its offer to the share-
holders, id., at § 137.54A. Meanwhile, the target company 
is free to disseminate information to its shareholders concern-
ing the impending offer. The contrast with the Williams Act 
is apparent. Under that Act, there is no pre-commencement 
notification requirement; the critical date is the date a tender 
offer is "first published or sent or given to security holders." 
15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(l). See also 17 CFR § 240.14d-2 (1981). 
We agree ~ with the Court of Appeals that by providing 
the target company with additional time within which to take 
steps to combat the offer, the precommencement notification 
provisions furnish incumbent management with a powerful 
tool to combat tender offers, perhaps to the detriment of the 
stockholders who will not have an offer before them during 
this period. 10 These consequences are precisely what Con-
gress determined should be avoided, and for this reason, the 
precommencement notification provision frustrates the objec-
tives of the Williams Act. 
It is important to note in this respect that in the course of 
events leading to the adoption of the Williams Act, Congress 
several times refused to impose a precommencement disclo-
sure requirement. In October 1965, Senator Williams intro-
duced S.2731, a bill which would have required a bidder to 
notify the target company and file a public statement with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission at least 20 days be-
fore commencement of a cash tender offer for more than five 
per cent of a class of the target company's securities. 111 
Cong. Rec. 28259 (1965). The Commission commented on 
the bill and stated that "the requirement of a 20-day advance 
notice to the issuer and the Commission is unnecessary for 
the protection of security holders ... " 112 Cong. Rec. 
190005 (1966). Senator Williams introduced a new bill in 
1967, S.510, which provided for a confidential filing by the 
•• See note 11 and accompanying text, infra. 
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tender offeror ·with the Commission five days prior to the 
commencement of the offer. S.510 was enacted as the Wil-
liams Act after elimination of the advance disclosure require-
ment. As the Senate Report explained, 
"At the hearings it was urged that this prior review was 
not necessary and in some cases might delay the offer 
when time was of the essence. In view of the authority 
and responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to take appropriate action in the event that inad-
equate or misleading information is disseminated to the 
public to solicit acceptance of a tender offer, the bill as 
approved by the committee requires only that the state-
ment be on file with the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission at the time the tender offer is first made to the 
public." Senate Report at 4. 
Congress rejected another pre-commencement notification 
proposal during deliberations on the 1970 amendments to the 
Williams Act. 11 
B 
For similar reasons, we agree with the Court of Appeals 
that the hearing provisions of the Illinois Act frustrate the 
congressional purpose by introducing extended delay into the 
"H. R. 4285, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The bill was not reported out 
of the subcommittee. Instead, the Senate amendments to the Williams 
Act, which did not contain pre-commencement notification provisions, 
were adopted. Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission has promulgated detailed 
rules governing the conduct of tender offers. Rule 14d-2(b), 17 CFR 
§ 240.14d-2(b) (1981), requires that a tender offeror make its offer effective 
within five days of publicly announcing the material terms of the offer by 
disseminating specified information to shareholders and filing the requisite 
documents with the Commission. Otherwise the offeror must announce 
that it is withdrawing its offer. The events in this litigation took place 
prior to the effective date of Rule 14d-2(b), and because Rule 14d-2(b) op-
erates prospectively only, see 44 Fed. Reg. 70326 (1979), it is not at issue 
in this case. 
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tender offer process. The Illinois Act allows the Secretary 
of State to call a hearing with respect to any tender offer sub-
ject to the Act, and the offer may not proceed until the hear-
ing is completed. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121112, §§ 137.57 A and 
B. (Supp. 1980) The Secretary may call a hearing at any 
time prior to the commencement of the offer, and there is no 
deadline for the completion of the hearing. I d., at 
§§ 137.57C and D. Although the Secretary is to render a de-
cision within 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing, that 
period may be extended without limitation. Not only does 
the Secretary of State have the power to delay a tender offer 
indefinitely, but incumbent management may also use the 
hearing provisions of the Illinois Act to delay a tender offer. 
The Secretary is required to call a hearing if requested to do 
so by, among other persons, those who are located in Illinois 
"as determined by post office address as shown on the 
records of the target company and who hold of record or ben-
eficially, or both, at least 10% of the outstanding shares of 
any class of equity securities which is the subject of the take-
over offer." !d., at § 137.57.A. Since incumbent manage-
ment in many cases will control, either directly or indirectly, 
10% of the target company's shares, this provision allows 
management to delay the commencement of an offer by in-
sisting on a hearing. As the Court of Appeals observed, 
these provisions potentially afford management a "powerful 
weapon to stymie indefinitely a takeover." 633 F. 2d, at 
494. 12 In enacting the Williams Act, Congress itself "recog-
nized that delay can seriously impede a tender offer" and 
sought to avoid it. G1·eat Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 
12 Delay has been characterized as "the most potent weapon in a tender 
offer fight." Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Ef-
fects, and Political Competency, 62 Cornell L. Q. 213, 238 (1977). See also 
Wachtel!, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. L. 1433, 
1437-1442 (1977); Wilner and Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover 
Laws and Their Constitutionality, 45 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 9--10 (1976). 
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577 F. 2d 1256, 1277 (CA5 1978); Senate Report at 4. 13 
Congress reemphasized the consequences of delay when it 
enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 
Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383, 15 U. S. C. 12, et seq. 
"[l]t is clear that this short waiting period [the ten-day 
period for proration provided for by § 14(d)(6) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act, which applies only after a tender 
offer is commenced] was founded on congressional con-
cern that a longer delay might unduly favor the target 
firm's incumbent management, and permit them to frus-
trate many pro-competitive cash tenders. This ten-day 
waiting period thus underscores the basic purpose of the 
Williams Act-to maintain a neutral policy towards cash 
tender offers, by avoiding lengthy delays that might dis-
courage their chances for success." H. R. Rep. No. 
94-1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976). 14 
'
3 According to the Securities and Exchange Commission, delay enables 
a target company to: 
"(1) repurchase its own securities; 
"(2) announce dividend increases or stock splits; 
"(3) issue additional shares of stock; 
"(4) acquire other companies to produce an antitrust violation should the 
tender offer succeed; 
"(5) arrange a defensive merger; 
"(6) enter into restrictive loan agreements , 
"(7) institute litigation challenging the tender offer." Brief for the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission as amicus curiae 10, n. 8. 
" Representative Rodino set out the consequences of delay in greater 
detail when he described the relationship between the Hart-Scott-Rodino 
Act and the Williams Act: 
"In the case of cash tender offers, more so than in other mergers, the equi-
ties include time and the danger of undue delay. This bill in no way in-
tends to repeal or reverse the congresional purpose underlying the 1968 
Williams Act, or the 1970 amendments to that act. . . . Lengthier delays 
will give the target firm plenty of time to defeat the offer, by abolishing 
cumulative voting, arranging a speedy defense merger, quickly incorporat-
ing in a State with an antitakeover statute, or negotiating costly lifetime 
employment contracts for incumbent menagement. And the longer the 
waiting period, the more the target's stock may be bid up in the market, 
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As we have said, Congress anticipated investors and the 
takeover offeror be free to go forward ¥.'ithout unreasonable 
delay. The potential for delay provided by the hearing pro-
visions upset the balance struck by Congress by favoring 
management at the expense of stockholders. We therefore 
agree with the Court of Appeals that these hearing provi-
sions conflict with the Williams Act. 
c 
The Court of Appeals also concluded that the Illinois Act is 
pre-empted by the Williams Act insofar as it ~s th~ec­
retary of State .2f Illinois to pass on the substantive fairn~s 
of a-tender offer. Unaer "§131.'57EOhhe l1Iinois law, the 
Secretary i;;e'Quired to deny registration of a takeover offer 
if he finds that the offer "fails to provide full and fair disclo-
sure to the offerees ... or that the take-over offer is inequita-
ble .... " (Emphasis added). 15 The Court of Appeals un-
derstood the Williams Act and its legislative history to 
indicate that Congress intended for investors to be free to 
make their own decisions. We agree. Both the House and 
Senate Reports observed that the Act was designed to "make 
the relevant facts known so that shareholders have a fair 
opportunity to make their decision." H. R. Rep. No. 1711, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968); Senate Rept. at 3. Thus, as 
the Court of Appeals said, "the state thus offers investor pro-
tection at the expense of investor autonomy-an approach 
making the offer more costly-and less successful. Should this happen, it 
will mean that shareholders of the target firm will be effectively deprived 
of the choice that cash tenders give to them: Either accept the offer and 
thereby gain the tendered premium, or reject the offer. Generally, the 
courts have construed the Williams Act so as to maintain these two options 
for the target company's shareholders, and the House conferees contem-
plate that the courts will continue to do so." 122 Cong. Rec. 30877 (1976). 
'
6 Appellant argues that the Illinois Act does not permit him to ajudicate 
the substantive fairness of a tender offer. Brief for Appellant 21-22. On 
this state-law issue, however, we follow the view of the Court of Appeals 
that§ 137.57.E allows the Secretary of State "to pass upon the substantive 
fairness of a tender offer ... . " 633 F. 2d, at 493. 
= 
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I 
quite in conflict ·with that adopted by Congress." 633 F. 2d, 
at 494. 
v 
The Commerce Clause provides that "Congress shall have 
Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several 
states." U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. "[A]t least since 
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299 (1852), it has been 
clear that 'the Commerce Clause. . . . even without imple-
mentin le "slation by Congress is a lfm1tabon upon the 
power of the tates. ' rea an tc · act c ea Co. v. 
Cottrell, 424 U. S. 366, 370--371 (1976), quoting Freeman v. 
Hewitt, 329 U. S. 249, 252 (1946). See also Lewis v. BT In-
vestment Managers, Inc., 447 U. S. 27, 35 (1980). Not 
every exercise of state power with some impact on interstate 
commerce is invalid. A state statute must be upheld if it 
"regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local pub-
lic interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental . . . unless the burden iumposed on such commerce 
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 141 (1970), citing 
Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U. S. 440, 443 (1960). 
I The Commerce Clause, however, permits only incidental regulation of interstate commerce by the states; direct regu-lation is prohibited. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 
U. S. 189, 199 (1925). The Illinois Act violates these princi-
ples for two reasons. First:' it directly reg:Ulates interstate 
commerce through the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. Second, the burden the Act imposes on interstate com-
merce is excessive in light of the local interests the Act pur-
ports to further. 
A 
States have traditionally regulated intrastate securities 
transactions, 16 and this Court has upheld the authority of 
'
6 For example, the Illinois Blue Sky law, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121 112, 
§ 137.1, et seq. (Supp. 1980), provides that securities subject to the law 
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states to enact "blue-sky" laws against Commerce Clause 
challenges on several occasions. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 
242 U. S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards 
Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N. W. Halsey & Co., 
242 U. S. 568 (1917). The Court's rationale for upholding I 
the state laws was that the laws only regulated transactions 
occurring within the regulated states. "The provisions of 
the law . . . apply to dispositions of securities within the 
State and while information of those issued in other States 
and foreign countries is required to be filed ... they are only 
affected by the requirement of a license of one who deals with 
them within the State. . . . Such regulations affect inter-
state commerce in securities only incidentally." Hall v. Gei-
ger-Jones Co., supra, at 557-558 (cites omitted). Congress 
has also recognized the validity of such laws governing intra-
state securities transactions in § 28a of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(a), a provision "designed to 
save state blue-sky laws from preemption." Leroy v. Great 
Western Corp., 443 U. S. 173, 182, n. 13 (1979). 
The Illinois Act differs subtantially from state blue-sky ( 
laws in that it directly regulates transactions which take 
place across state lines, even if wholly outside the state of Il-
linois. Although in this case some 27% of Chicago Rivet's 
shareholders were Illinois residents, the Illinois Act applied 
to transactions with any of its shareholders, wherever lo-
cated. Also, it would have applied even if none of Chicago 
Rivet's shareholders were Illinois residents, since the Act ap-
plies to every tender offer for a corporation meeting two of 
the following conditions: the corporation has its principal ex-
ecutive office in Illinois, is organized under Illinois laws, or 
has at least 10% of its stated capital and paid-in surplus rep-
resented in Illinois. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, 
§ 137.52-10.(2) (Supp. 1980). Thus the Act could be applied 
to regulate a tender offer which would not affect a single Illi-
nois shareholder. 
must be registered "prior to sale in this State . . . " ld., at§ 137.5. 
'? 
I 
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The Illinois statute has S\\'eeping extraterritorial effect. 
A tender offer for the securities of a publicly-held corporation 
is ordinarily communicated by use of the mails or other 
means of interstate commerce to shareholders across the 
country and abroad; securities are tendered to the offeror by 
similar means. Yet the Illinois Act operates directly on 
these interstate transactions even when they take place en-
tirely outside the state. The Commerce Clause has long pre-
cluded the application of a statute such as the Illinois Act to 
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the state's bor-
ders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the 
state. In Shafer v. Farrners Grain Co., supra, at 199, the 
Court held that "a state statute which by its necessary opera-
tion directly interferes with or burdens ... [interstate] com-
merce is a prohibited regulation and invalid, regardless of the 
purpose with which it was enacted." See also Hughes v. Al-
exandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 806 (1976). Similarly, 
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 775 (1945), 
the Court struck down on Commerce Clause grounds a state 
law where the "practical effect of such regulation is to control 
... [conduct] beyond the boundaries of the state .... " 
The limits on a state's power to enact substantive legisla-
tion are similar to the limits on the jurisdiction of state 
courts. In either case, "any attempt 'directly' to assert ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction over persons or property would of-
fend sister States and exceed the inherent limits of the 
State's power." Shafer v. Heitner, 433 U. S. 186, 197 
(1977). Because the Illinois Act purports to regulate di-
rectly conduct occurring wholly outside the state, it must be 
held invalid as were the laws at issue in Shafe1· and Southern 
Pacific. 
B 
The Illinois Act is also unconstitutional under the test of 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S., at 142, for even when 
a state statute regulates interstate commerce indirectly, the 
burden imposed on that commerce must not be excessive in 
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relation to the local interests served by the statute. The 
most obvious burden the Illinois Act imposes on interstate 
commerce arises from the statute's previously-described ex-
traterritorial reach which purports to give Illinois the power 
to determine whether a nationwide tender offer may proceed. 
The effects of allowing the Illinois Secretary of State to 
block a nationwide tender offer are substantial. Sharehold-
ers are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a 
premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their 
highest-valued use, a process which can improve efficiency 
and competition, is hindered. The incentive the tender offer 
mechanism provides incumbent management to perform well 
so that stock prices remain high is reduced. See 
Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 
1161, 117~1174 (1981); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market 
Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regula-
tion of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 5, 27-28, 45 
(1978); H. R. Rep. No. 94-1373, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 
(1976). 
Appellant claims the Illinois Act furthers two legitimate 
local interests. He argues that Illinois seeks to protect resi-
dent security holders and that the Act merely regulates the 
internal affairs of companies incorporated under Illinois law. 
We agree with the Court of Appeals that these asserted in-
terests are insufficient to outweigh the burdens Illinois im-
poses on interstate commerce. 
While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimate state 
objective, the state has no legitimate interest in protecting 
non-resident shareholders. Insofar as the Illinois law bur-
dens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed 
in the balance to sustain the law. We note, furthermore, 
that the Act completely exempts from coverage a corpora-
tion's acquisition of its own shares. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 
112, § 137.52.09(4). Thus Chicago Rivet was able to make a 
competing tender offer for its own stock without complying 
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with the Illinois Act, leaving Chicago Rivet's shareholders to 
depend only on the protections afforded them by federal se-
curities law, protections which Illinois views as inadequate to 
protect investors in other contexts. This distinction is at 
variance with Illinois' asserted legislative purpose, and tends 
to undermine appellant's justification for the burdens the 
statute imposes on interstate commerce. 
We are also unconvinced that the Illinois Act substantially 
enhances the shareholders' position. The Illinois Act seeks 
to protect shareholders of a company subject to a tender offer 
by requiring disclosures regarding the offer, assuring that 
shareholders have adequate time to decide whether to tender 
their shares, and according shareholders withdrawal, prora-
tion and equal consideration rights. However, the Williams 
Act provides these same substantive protections, compare 
Ill. Rev. Ann. Stat., ch. 121112, §§ 137.59.C, D, and E (Supp. 
1980) (withdrawal, proration, and equal consideration rights) 
with 15 U. S. C. § 78n(d)(5), (6) and (7) and 17 CFR 
§ 240.14d-7 (same). As the Court of Appeals noted, the dis-
closures required by the Illinois Act which go beyond those 
mandated by the Williams Act and the regulations pursuant 
to it may not substantially enhance the shareholders' ability 
to make informed decisions. 633 F. 2d, at 500. It also was 
of the view that the possible benefits of the potential delays 
required by the Act may be outweighed by the increased risk 
that the tender offer will fail due to defensive tactics em-
ployed by incumbent management. We are unprepared to 
disagree with the Court of Appeals in these respects, and 
conclude that the protections the Illinois Act affords resident 
security holders are, for the most part, speculative. 
Appellant also contends that Illinois has an interest in 
regulating the internal affairs of a corporation incorporated 
under its laws. The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of 
laws principle which recognizes that only one state should 
have the authority to regulate a corporation's internal af-
fairs-matters peculiar to the relationships among or be-
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tween the corporation and its current officers, directors, and 
shareholders-because otherwise a corporation could be 
faced with conflicting demands. See Restatement (Second) 
of Conflict of Laws, § 302, Comment b at 307-308 (1971). 
That doctrine is of little use to the state in this context. The 
Illinois Act applies to tender offers for any corporation for 
which 10% of the outstanding shares are held by Illinois resi-
dents, Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 121 112, § 137.52-10 (Supp. 1980). 
The Act thus applies to corporations that are not incorpo-
rated in Illinois and have their principal place of business in 
other states. Illinois has no interest in regulating the inter-
nal affairs of foreign corporations. 
We conclude with the Court of Appeals that the Illinois Act 
imposes a substantial on interstate commerce which out-
weighs its putative local benefits. It is accordingly invalid 
under the Commerce Clause. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
